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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Abstract 
The subject of the present thesis is the statistical analysis of the Non Accidental Structural 
Failures (NASF) and machinery failures on tankers with deadweight larger than 60.000t 
(“large tankers”), that occurred in the period 1990-2011 independently of year of built. We 
may distinguish 8 main categories of tanker accidents, namely: 
 Non Accidental Structural Failures (NASF)  
 Machinery failures 
 Collision  
 Contact  
 Grounding  
 Fire  
 Explosion  
 Hull fittings failures  
All necessary data  for the present analysis were deduced from the NTUA-SDL tanker 
accidents  database (National Technical University of Athens-Ship Design Laboratory). 
Germanischer Lloyd disposed also very useful data concerning mainly the annual Fleet at 
Risk, broken down by age, ship size and hull type for the studied period. 
 
1.2 Scope of the thesis 
The subject  of the present thesis is the statistical analysis of the Non Accidental Structural 
Failures (NASF) and machinery failures on tankers with deadweight larger than 60.000t 
(“large tankers”), that occurred in the period 1990-2011 independently of year of built. 
Shipping is of great importance, because goods should be somehow transported and the 
most efficient way to transport large quantities of cargoes till today is on ships. Ship’s 
operation is not free of hazards, as it poses threat against human life, environment and lastly 
financial interests. These hazards should be identified, recorded and analyzed in order to be 
restricted.  
The aim of this thesis is to analyze existing data for NASF and machinery failures. The general 
assessment criteria taken into consideration are: 
 Event location, ship operation, environment 
 Outcome of event 
 Fatalities, injuries 
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 Oil spill information 
 Shipyards, flags, classes 
Additionally the greater part of this research concerns NASF. NASF were analyzed  with 
additional parameters: 
 Basic hull type (double hull or non double hull) 
 Ship’s size (Panamax, Aframax, Suezmax, VLCC, ULCC). 
Hull type and ship’s size were not considered as important parameters for the study of 
machinery failure. 
Furthermore, two models were developed in the course of this thesis: 
1 A fault tree for NASF. 
2 A model that describes failures of machinery systems. 
As far as NASF are concerned, two characteristic accidents have been analyzed in order to 
show possible causes and consequences of (large scale) NASF: 
 Loss of “PRESTIGE” (19/11/2002) 
 Loss of “KATINA P” (26/04/1992) 
Lastly, comments and conclusions are drawn after each chapter, giving a general overview of 
each examined tanker’s accident category. 
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2 General information about large 
tankers 
 
2.1 Definition 
A tanker  is a merchant vessel designed to transport liquids or gases in bulk. Major types of 
tanker ships include the oil tanker, the chemical tanker and the  gas carrier. 
 
Figure 2.1. Typical oil tanker 
 
Figure 2.2. Typical chemical tanker 
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Figure 2.3. Typical gas tanker 
 
2.2 Background 
Tankers can range in size of capacity from several hundred tonnes, which includes vessels for 
servicing small harbours and coastal settlements, to several hundred thousand tons, for 
long-range haulage. Besides ocean- or seagoing tankers there are also specialized inland-
waterway tankers which operate on rivers and canals with an average cargo capacity up to 
some thousand tons . Tankers are used for bulk transporting of crude oil , finished 
petroleum products, liquefied natural gas (LNG), chemicals, edible oils, wine, juice, molasses, 
fresh water, and other liquids. 
Tankers are a relatively new concept, dating from the later years of the 19th century. Before 
this, technology had simply not supported the idea of carrying bulk liquids. The market was 
also not geared towards transporting or selling cargo in bulk,  therefore most ships carried a 
wide range of different products in different holds and traded outside fixed routes. Liquids 
were usually loaded in casks, hence the term "tonnage", which refers to the volume of the 
holds in terms of how many tuns or casks of wine could be carried. Even potable water, vital 
for the survival of the crew, was stowed in casks. Carrying bulk liquids in earlier ships posed 
several problems: 
 The holds: on timber ships the holds were not sufficiently water, oil or air-tight to 
prevent a liquid cargo from spoiling or leaking. The development of iron and steel hulls 
solved this problem. 
 Loading and discharging: Bulk liquids must be pumped - the development of efficient 
pumps and piping systems was vital to the development of the tanker. Steam engines 
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were developed as prime-movers for early pumping systems. Dedicated cargo handling 
facilities were now required ashore too - as was a market for receiving a product in that 
quantity. Casks could be unloaded using ordinary cranes, and the awkward nature of the 
casks meant that the volume of liquid was always relatively small - therefore keeping 
the market more stable. 
 Free Surface Effect: a large body of liquid carried aboard a ship will impact on the ship's 
stability, particularly when the liquid is flowing around the hold or tank in response to 
the ship's movements. The effect was negligible in casks, but could cause capsizing if the 
tank extended the width of the ship; a problem solved by extensive subdivision of the 
tanks. 
 
Tankers were first used by the oil industry to transfer refined fuel in bulk from refineries to 
customers. This would then be stored in large tanks ashore, and customized for delivery to 
individual locations. The use of tankers caught on because other liquids were also cheaper to 
transport in bulk, stored in dedicated terminals, then prepared for delivery to consumers. 
Even the Guinness brewery used tankers to transport the stout across the Irish Sea. 
Different products require different handling and transport, with specialized variants such as 
"chemical tankers", "oil tankers", and "LNG carriers" developed to handle dangerous 
chemicals, oil and oil-derived products, and liquefied natural gas respectively. These broad 
variants may be further differentiated with respect to ability to carry only a single product or 
simultaneously transport mixed cargoes such as several different chemicals or refined 
petroleum products. Among oil tankers, supertankers are designed for transporting oil 
around the Horn of Africa from the Middle East. Supertankers are one of the three preferred 
methods for transporting large quantities of oil, along with pipeline transport and rail. 
Despite being highly regulated, tankers have been involved in environmental disasters 
resulting from oil spills 
 
2.3 Design considerations 
Many modern tankers are designed for a specific cargo and a specific route. Draft is typically 
limited by the depth of water in loading and unloading harbors; and may be limited by the 
depth of straits along the preferred shipping route. Cargoes with high vapor pressure at 
ambient temperatures may require pressurized tanks or vapor recovery systems. Tank 
heaters may be required to maintain heavy crude oil, residual fuel, asphalt, wax, or molasses 
in a fluid state for offloading. 
Nowadays double hulls or double bottoms have been required in all ships. (MARPOL  
conventions). The double hull concept provides some extra safety against environmental 
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pollution, but does not protect against major, high-energy collisions or groundings which 
cause the majority of oil pollution, despite this being the reason that the double hull was 
mandated by United States legislation. 
Additionally, design issues are raised. Examples: 1) The stability of the double hull ship can 
be less than that of a single hull. Because the double hull raises the center of gravity, the 
metacentric height is reduced.  2) A double-hulled tanker does not need longitudinal 
bulkheads for longitudinal strength, as the inner hull already provides this. Eliminating 
longitudinal bulkheads would result in much wider tanks, significantly increasing the free 
surface effect. However, this problem is easily corrected with the addition of anti-slosh 
baffles and partial bulkheads.3) Increased surface area of the structure inside the ballast 
tanks. Because these tanks are much longer and narrower than those in single hull tankers, 
their surface area can be two to three times that of the ballast tanks in a single hull ship. 
Thus, inspection issues become even more vital, as possibly weak structural points are 
multiplied. 
 
2.4 Classification of tankers by size 
 
Handysize: There is no official definition in terms of exact tonnages, but usually refers to 
tankers with a deadweight 10.000-35000t. 
Handymax: There is no official definition in terms of exact tonnages, but usually refers to 
tankers with a deadweight 35000-50000(60000)t Handysize and Handymax tankers can 
enter smaller ports in order to pick up cargoes . In most cases they are fitted with cranes , 
which means that they can load and discharge cargoes at ports which lack cranes or other 
cargo handling systems. Most of them operate within regional trade routes. 
Panamax: Panamax are the mid-sized tankers that are capable of passing through the lock 
chambers of the Panama Canal. They have a deadweight tonnage between 60000 and 79999 
t. These tankers are primarily used for carrying crude oil and petroleum products. A typical 
Panamax tanker is 220 m long, 32 m wide, and 13.6 m in draught corresponding to about 
70000 DWT. 
 
Aframax: Aframax are medium-sized crude tankers with a deadweight tonnage (DWT) 
ranging between 80000 and 119999. The average fuel carrying capacity of Aframax vessels is 
approximately 750000 barrels. Due to their size, Aframax tankers are able to serve most 
ports in the world. A typical Aframax tanker is 240 m long, 43 m wide, and 14.3 m in draught 
corresponding to about 105000 DWT. 
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Suezmax: Suezmax are medium to large-sized tankers with a deadweight tonnage (DWT) 
ranging between 120000 and 199999 t. They are the largest marine vessels that meet the 
restrictions of the Suez, and are capable of transiting the canal in a laden condition. A typical 
Suezmax tanker is 275 m long, 48 m wide, and 16.2 m in draught corresponding to about 
150000 DWT. 
Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC): VLCC are large size tankers with deadweight tonnage 
ranging between 200000 to 320000. These tankers are capable of passing through the Suez 
Canal in Egypt, and as a result are used extensively around the North Sea, Mediterranean 
and West Africa. A VLCC can measure up to 470 m in length, up to 60 m in width, and has a 
draught of up to 20 m. 
Ultra Large Crude Carriers: ULCC or Ultra Large Crude Carriers are the largest tankers in the 
world with a size ranging between 320000 to 550000 DWT.  Due to their huge size, they 
require custom built terminals. As a result, they are able to serve limited number of ports in 
the world. They are primarily used for very long distance crude oil transportation, especially 
from the Persian Gulf to Europe, Asia and North America. Today, ULCC are among the largest 
shipping vessels with standard dimensions of 415 meters length, 63 meters width, and 35 
meters draught. Knock Nevis was the longest ULCC supertanker ever built in the world with 
dimensions of 458.4 meters length and 68 meters in width. 
 
2.5 Fleets of the world 
Flag states: As of 2005, the United States Maritime Administration's statistics count 4024 
tankers of 10000 LT DWT or greater worldwide. 2582 of these are double-hulled. Panama is 
the leading flag state of tankers with 592 registered ships. Five other flag states have more 
than two hundred registered tankers: Liberia (520), The Marshall 
Islands (323), Greece(233), Singapore (274) and The Bahamas (215). These flag states are 
also the top six in terms of fleet size in terms of deadweight tonnage.  
Largest fleets: Greece, Japan, and the United States are the top three owners of tankers 
(including those owned but registered to other nations), with 733, 394, and 311 vessels 
respectively. These three nations account for 1438 vessels or over 36% of the world's fleet.  
Builders: Asian companies dominate the construction of tankers. Of the world's 4024 
tankers, 2822 or over 70% were built in South Korea, Japan or China. 
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3  Approach and methodology 
 
3.1 Source of information on large tankers 
accidents  
The necessary information for this research was provided by National Technical University of 
Athens and Germanischer Lloyd. In particular: 
1 NTUA-SDL database was the main source of information. In the database are included 
146 NASF cases and 417 machinery cases that meet the criteria of particular research. A 
screenshot of the used database is given in the following. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Screenshot of NTUA-SDL database 
 
There is plenty of data for every single case:  
a) name, ID, LR Nr., incident year, date of built, DWT, FLAG, location, degree of severity, ship 
type¸ incident type, text that gives details for the incident, complementary texts.  
15 
 
Evangelos Farmakis                                NTUA-Ship Design Labotarory                             September 2014 
 
b) oil spill information: oil spill location, proximity to shore, spill area, pollution quantity, 
amount recovered, source of pollution.  
c) information on fatalities/ injuries: serious injuries, non serious injuries, killed#, missing #.  
d) incident location-ship operation-environment: geographic area, event location, operating 
condition, seaway, wind, visibility, icing.  
e) outcome of incident: Loss Of Watertight Integrity(LOWI), broken in pieces, towed away, 
total loss/capsize, sailed by her means, remains afloat, extent of repairs, sold for demolition, 
broken up, no damage reported, no damage sustained, 
f) shipyards, flag, classification societies:  date, when the ship was delivered, where it was 
built, class when it was built, flag when it was built. 
In some cases the quality of information within the complementary text is poor without any 
technical information. 
In some cases it is stated that there was an oil release, resulting from the accident, but there 
is no description as far as the amount of oil spilled is concerned. Therefore, an amount of oil 
spill had to be assumed. 
These boxes are not filled completely, mostly because it was not possible to have access to 
every piece of information needed in order to fill out these boxes. 
2 The database was partly enriched with personal effort. Information concerns mainly 
shipyards, flags and classes and was found on: 
 GISIS (Global Integrated Shipping Information System)database by IMO                       
(International Maritime Organisation) 
 www.maritime-connector.com 
 www.aukevisser.nl 
 IRS(International Register of Shipping) 
3 Germanischer Lloyd provided very useful data: Annual Fleet at risk by age, size and hull 
type. 
 
Table 3.1. Fleet at risk (in shipyears) independently of year of built. Time period 1990-2011. 
Focusing on basic hull type (DH, non DH) and ship’s size. 
year Panamax   AFRAMAX Suezmax VLCC   ULCC   
  DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH 
1990 23,3 173,2 31,6 362,1 11,2 229,6 0,0 385,2 0,0 54,0 
1991 26,4 175,1 46,2 369,2 17,7 227,5 1,7 392,6 0,0 54,0 
1992 28,7 168,1 72,0 366,4 36,6 229,6 5,3 400,5 0,0 54,0 
1993 38,2 160,0 103,9 348,7 48,7 220,9 18,0 394,9 0,0 54,0 
1994 42,9 155,9 125,7 335,0 57,5 212,3 28,2 390,0 0,0 53,9 
1995 45,7 149,6 139,2 323,8 65,9 200,9 35,9 368,5 0,0 53,0 
1996 46,8 147,8 154,2 318,9 74,7 188,9 55,3 354,2 0,0 53,0 
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1997 48,3 146,0 172,3 311,0 82,8 179,4 70,6 341,9 0,0 52,3 
1998 49,2 144,7 198,7 303,9 100,0 172,9 80,7 332,0 0,0 52,0 
1999 54,7 140,8 241,6 292,3 119,3 157,8 104,9 310,0 0,0 50,5 
2000 69,1 137,1 275,3 263,6 139,6 129,4 141,0 269,6 0,0 43,7 
2001 78,5 133,4 292,0 252,5 158,4 114,6 173,5 250,5 0,0 40,7 
2002 85,7 127,0 314,6 230,0 177,2 88,0 203,5 209,5 1,6 29,4 
2003 102,7 113,2 377,3 203,8 202,1 74,0 244,3 178,1 3,8 17,6 
2004 136,8 95,6 444,0 166,2 229,2 58,2 275,3 154,8 4,2 7,0 
2005 175,2 83,6 500,0 140,7 254,2 51,6 305,4 146,6 6,3 3,7 
2006 216,7 78,8 556,6 124,3 279,1 51,0 327,2 142,8 7,9 2,9 
2007 258,7 67,5 608,5 111,4 305,2 49,0 354,2 135,8 8,3 1,2 
2008 296,1 54,7 664,1 97,8 319,7 41,1 387,0 118,7 10,6 0,8 
2009 339,5 42,9 753,5 72,8 346,7 31,2 440,1 89,9 14,5 0,0 
2010 364,9 29,8 825,7 46,6 389,6 18,3 492,1 57,2 16,4 0,0 
2011 391,6 13,6 880,3 30,4 422,0 7,9 550,2 35,1 24,1 0,0 
 
NOTE: In the table above one can notice decimal places. That can be better explained 
through an example: A ship travels/ has a contract for 9 months during a year. That will 
count for 9 months/12 months per year= 0,75 shipyears. 
 
Figure 3.2. Annual change of fleet at risk for DH and non DH ships 
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Table 3.2. Fleet at risk (in shipyears) by age. Ships due or delivered after 1981. Time period 
1990-2012. Focusing on basic hull type (DH, non DH) and ship’s size. 
 age Panamax AFRAMAX Suezmax VLCC   ULCC   
  DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH 
1 416,0 67,0 929,5 113,0 452,0 50,0 582,0 136,0 31,0 41,0 
2 390,0 67,0 869,8 113,0 408,0 50,0 517,0 136,0 21,0 41,0 
3 359,0 67,0 798,0 113,0 370,5 50,0 459,3 136,0 16,0 41,0 
4 321,0 67,0 702,0 113,0 325,0 50,0 406,0 136,0 12,0 41,0 
5 278,0 67,0 634,0 113,0 311,0 50,0 366,0 136,0 9,0 41,0 
6 236,0 67,0 577,7 113,0 286,0 50,0 337,0 135,2 8,0 41,0 
7 192,0 67,0 528,0 113,0 260,0 50,0 319,0 135,0 7,0 41,0 
8 147,0 67,0 464,0 113,0 235,0 50,0 287,6 135,0 4,6 41,0 
9 111,0 67,0 410,0 113,0 208,0 50,0 257,0 134,1 2,0 41,0 
10 88,0 67,0 333,0 113,0 184,0 50,0 220,0 134,0 1,0 41,0 
11 78,0 67,0 296,9 112,2 160,0 49,7 184,0 134,0 0,0 41,0 
12 74,0 67,0 282,0 112,0 143,7 48,7 157,0 134,0 0,0 41,0 
13 59,0 67,0 261,0 110,5 121,0 48,0 117,0 134,0 0,0 41,0 
14 49,0 67,0 211,6 108,0 105,3 48,0 86,8 132,3 0,0 40,2 
15 48,0 67,0 179,0 105,3 83,4 47,5 72,0 127,8 0,0 40,0 
16 47,0 67,0 159,6 104,3 70,5 45,5 62,7 119,8 0,0 40,0 
17 45,0 66,1 141,9 101,4 60,0 43,7 41,5 101,2 0,0 39,4 
18 41,6 63,2 127,8 99,6 51,0 39,3 30,0 83,7 0,0 38,3 
19 38,0 61,3 105,1 93,4 41,1 35,7 24,6 63,6 0,0 35,7 
20 29,7 57,2 78,0 83,9 28,7 29,9 6,6 44,6 0,0 31,6 
21 21,0 56,4 45,5 72,6 15,8 23,3 1,2 29,3 0,0 28,8 
22 17,8 53,2 32,9 65,4 6,0 15,5 0,0 21,4 0,0 26,0 
23 14,3 48,4 20,4 53,9 6,0 10,5 0,0 15,1 0,0 23,3 
24 12,3 42,6 13,1 36,5 2,0 8,0 0,0 9,1 0,0 14,8 
25 10,1 36,7 8,0 23,6 1,0 7,3 0,0 6,8 0,0 8,6 
26 7,8 24,4 5,0 15,5 0,0 6,0 0,0 3,3 0,0 6,2 
27 4,3 8,6 2,0 7,1 0,0 5,9 0,0 3,0 0,0 1,5 
28 4,0 5,1 0,0 2,0 0,0 3,2 0,0 2,0 0,0 0,0 
29 0,0 2,2 0,0 1,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 1,4 0,0 0,0 
30 0,0 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 
31 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
32 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
 
NOTE:. It was not possible to find data for all large tankers regardless of year of built, as 
far as age is concerned. 
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3.2 Definitions-Explanations concerning NTUA-
SDL database 
 
Event 
An event is defined as something that happens or takes place, especially one of importance.1 
 
Accident 
An accident is defined as a sudden, not intended, event that causes loss of human life, 
personal injury, damage to the environment, and/or loss of assets and financial interests.2 
 
Event location 
In the NTUA-SDL database, the registration of casualty’s location is based on the IMO 
relevant description on event location, namely at Berth, Anchorage, Port, Port Approach, 
Inland waters, Canals, Rivers, Archipelagos, Coastal (<12 miles off) ,Open Sea, shipyards and 
drydocks.  
Based on the above categorization, four different event locations were identified as the 
basic categorization for the risk analysis of different events. The four different states are 
further related to different type of sea areas with different conditions for rescue efforts and 
environmental pollution, namely:  
• Terminal areas (Port, Anchorage, Port Approach and at Berth). The ship lies at berth/ port 
or is operating at low speed because of port or berth approaching or anchorage operations. 
• Operation in congested waters (Coastal (<12 miles off) or restricted waters). Areas within 
congested waters are characterized by high density traffic.  
• En route at sea (Open Sea (≥12 miles off) & Archipelagos). Ship has her full operational 
speed.  
• Operation in limited waters (Rivers, Canals and Inland waters). 
•Operation in shipyards and drydocks. 
Weather 
 There are only few cases with enough data about the weather. Therefore, the weather was 
considered as “bad” in these cases: “heavy weather damage”, “force 11 storm”, “cyclone”, 
“heavy seas”. 
 
LOWI (Loss Of Watertight Integrity) 
The probability of hull breaching in case of an accident is considered essential for the 
sequence of events and consequences of the accident. 
 LOWI was considered in these cases: “bottom damage”, “broke in two and sank”, 
“forepeak flooded, bow section broke off”, “damage to hull structure”, “shell 
plating damage”, “oil spill-leakage”, “cracks below waterline”, “reported taking 
water”, “bow damage and took water”, “hull holed”, “double bottom ballast tank 
fracture”, “ingress of water”, “cracks near sea chest”. 
                                                          
1
 www.oxforddictionaries.com 
2 M. Rausand, “System Reliability Theory (2nd ed.)”, Wiley, 2004 
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 No LOWI :”deck damage”, “fractures on internal structural members”, “heavy 
weather damage(without further details)”, “minor crack in cargo tank”, “damage to 
bulkhead”, “crack in weld of a tank”, “damage to a tank”, “crack in weld of a tank”, 
“tank’s structural damage”, “crack between cargo tank and the duct keel”, “internal 
hull structure damage” 
 
Degree of severity   
NTUA-SDL database is based on IHS database. According to IHS database an accident is 
considered serious, if one of the following situations applies: 
 Structural damage, rendering the ship unseaworthy, such as penetration of hull 
underwater, immobilization of main engines, extensive damages etc. 
 Breakdown 
 Actual total loss 
 Any other undefined situation resulting in damage or financial loss, which is 
considered to be serious 
 
Attention must be paid to the “any other undefined situation resulting in damage or 
financial loss, which is considered to be serious”. This definition is relative and it is clearly up 
to the user/analyst of the IHS-database to determine the severity degree. Furthermore, the 
term “financial loss” is not determined. 
 
Ship other transfer-ship internal transfer 
“Ship other transfer”-When cargo was transferred to another ship(lightering) in order to 
improve ship’s stability as a result of an accident. 
“Ship internal transfer”-When cargo had been transferred  to another tank/tanks in an effort 
to improve a ship’s stability as a result of an accident.  
 
Ship’s part damaged(Nature of damage) 
This category indicates which part of the ship was damaged and concerns NASF. The goal is 
to clarify which database descriptions were categorized under each of the four categories, 
namely hull, deck, internal, unknown. 
1. Hull:”broke in two and sank”, ”forepeak flooded, tanks open to sea”, ”crack in tank 
and oil spill (and/or water ingress) ,”damage to hull”, ”shell plating damage and 
cracks”, “repairs to hull”, “cracked hull”, “2 cracks below the waterline”, ”starboard 
shell damage”, “oil leakage from tank/tanks”, “reported taking water” 
2. Deck:”deck damage”,” crack in main deck”, “corrosion to main deck” 
3. Internal: ”crack in tank without oil spill(or water ingress) “, “bottom damage”, 
“internal structural members damage”, “crack between cargo hold and duct keel”, 
“damage to bulkheads”, ”structural damage”, ”crack in a weld of a tank” 
4. Unknown:”heavy weather damage” 
 
Oil recovery 
Indicates in an oil spill case which amount of spilled oil was eventually recovered from sea. 
 
Hull type 
In this research hull types are divided in two main categories. 
1. Double hull: Here are included “double hull(13F)”, “double hull(MARPOL)”, “double 
hull” 
2. Non double hull: Here are included “single hull”, “double bottom entire 
compartment length”, “double sides entire compartment length” 
3. Unknown: When there is no data available concerning the hull type 
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Flag: NTUA-SDL database includes different abbreviations for flags, which do not correspond 
totally to a worldwide accepted abbreviation list. Thus, the following list contains all these 
abbreviations and their interpretation. Lastly, it should be noted, that  in some cases the full 
flag’s name is encountered in NTUA-SDL database. 
 
 
Table 3.3. Interpretation for flags’ abbreviations (encountered in NTUA-SDL database) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
abbreviation flag abbreviation flag 
Pa Panama Qt. Qatar 
Am. Autoridad maritima de 
Panama 
Sg. Singapore 
Br. Bermuda Sw. Sweden 
Bs. Bahamas Tu. Tuvalu 
Cy. Cyprus Ve. Venezuela 
Gb. Gibraltar SL Sri Lanka 
Gr. Greece HK Hong Kong 
In. India DIS Denmark 
International 
Register 
IoM Isle of Man Rm. Romania 
It. Italy TAAF French Southern 
and Antarctic 
Islands 
Iq. Iraq. My Malaysia 
Ir. Iran Sv. Saint Vincent 
Ku. Kuwait   
Li. Liberia   
Ly. Libya   
M.I. Marshall Islands   
Ma. Malta   
NIS Norwegian 
International Register 
  
No. Norway   
Ph.  Philippines   
21 
 
Evangelos Farmakis                                NTUA-Ship Design Labotarory                             September 2014 
 
4 Analysis of Non Accidental 
Structural Failures 
 
4.1 Full sample 
Non Accidental Structural Failure (NASF) events consist of scenarios where the hull presents 
cracks and fractures, which affect the vessel’s seaworthiness or efficiency. 
NASF will be studied focusing on basic hull types (DH and non-DH) and ship’s size (Panamax, 
Aframax, Suezmax, VLCC, ULCC).  
The full sample consists of 146 NASF cases.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Annual number of NASF and severity level. 
The figure above can be misleading, when focusing on the peaks. Subsequently, by studying 
frequencies safer conclusions could be drawn. 
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Figure 4.2. Group ages of large tankers involved in NASF. 
It can be noticed that 44% of NASF regard relatively old tankers, that means tankers older 
than 15 years. A relation between age and structural problems seems logical, if we take into 
consideration that problems, such as corrosion and fatigue, affect increasingly ships, as they 
get older. The most important finding of this diagram is that 12% of NASF accidents concerns 
young ships (till 5 years old). This seems strange and implies that there were certain 
manufacturing (mainly bad building quality and incorrect processes followed) problems 
among others that mainly played a role in this negative development. (see 4.6-“NASF fault 
tree”, for further causes of NASFs). Furthermore, there is not a straightforward relationship 
between ship’s age and NASF.   
 
Figure 4.3. Distribution of NASF by ship’s size. 
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Distribution of NASF by ship's size 
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Figure 4.4. Distribution of fleet at risk by ship’s size. 
By comparing the above two diagrams we understand, that there is no obvious relation 
between ship’s size and NASF, as the percentages are similar. There is one exception, that of 
ULCC. This seems logical, as ULCC are the largest of the large tankers and thus the developed 
stresses are greater in comparison to the other large tankers’ categories. As a result it is 
more likely, that structural overstressing occurs.  Nevertheless, that problem concerns ULCC 
and not VLCC. Contrariwise there is a great coincidence, that the percentage of VLCC that 
had a NASF, is same to the percentage of VLCC in the total fleet at risk (28%).  
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4.1.1 Event location, ship operation, environment 
 
Figure 4.5. Event location. Unknown cases excluded. 
Out of the146 NASF cases, we do not possess data for 42, that means 29%. In the above 
chart it is clear that event location plays a great role, as far as NASF are concerned. 57% took 
place in open sea and that can be attributed to two factors: 1) Large tankers spend a great 
percentage of their “operational” time in open sea. 2) Stresses developed in open sea are 
greater in contrast to more protected waters. Nevertheless it is worth noting, that large 
tankers are built to handle a wide range of weather conditions. 
A great percentage of NASF took place in terminal waters, where the ships in theory   
operate at a low speed and are mostly protected by extreme weather conditions. This can 
attributed mainly to loading mistakes (ship overloaded or false loaded).  
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Figure 4.6. Operating condition. Unknown cases excluded. 
With respect to operating condition, 36% of the cases are unknown. Apart from operating 
condition “sailing/en route”, which is greatly represented in this category, the other ones, 
that stand apart, are operating conditions “loading” and “ discharging”. That seems 
reasonable, as loading mistakes could occur during loading/unloading processes. Possible 
loading mistakes during those procedures could lead to overstressing of the hull. 
 
Figure 4.7. Loading condition. Unknown cases excluded. 
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Unfortunately, in this case we don’t possess data for 71% of the accidents (104 out of 146). 
Nevertheless, it is clear, when examining the cases  we possess data for, that loading 
condition plays an important role. To rephrase it, a loaded tanker is more likely to suffer a 
NASF in comparison to an unloaded tanker. 
 
Figure 4.8. Weather  
It was not possible to categorize further bad weather, to distinguish for example between 
“bad“  and “very bad weather” or regarding to significant wave height. Unfortunately in the 
most cases the only comments, that could be found in the complementary texts of each 
accident, are phrases such as “heavy weather”, ”heavy seas”,” typhoon”,” heavy seas”, 
“cyclone”, tropical depression”. There were no accidents, in which good weather was 
reported, probably because the one who compiled the report did not consider it important 
to write down the weather conditions, if they were not bad. As far as the 48 cases of bad 
weather conditions are concerned, they were to be found in these event locations: 
Table 4.1. Event location, where bad weather was encountered 
Open sea 36 
terminal 1 
congested 3 
unknown 8 
Bad weather condition cases  48 
 
This table indicates that (obviously) it is far more likely that bad weather condition would be 
encountered in open sea, but that is not absolutely certain. 
Last but not least, it should be again noted, that tankers are designed to handle a great 
range of weather condition. Despite that, weather conditions seem to play an important 
role. That can be possibly attributed to  lots of reasons, including building quality and 
worker’s skills (see 4.6-“NASF fault tree”, for other reasons that could lead- independently or 
combined- to NASF) 
bad 
33% 
no data 
67% 
weather 
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4.1.2 Outcome of event 
 
Figure 4.9. Percentage of NASF accidents, that led to LOWI. 
This graph indicates one of the most important reasons, why NASF should be examined 
further and in details: they lead highly likely to Loss Of Watertight Integrity of the tanker. 
The consequences vary and in the worst case scenario are sinking of the ship, environmental 
pollution and loss of life. This is only rarely the case, but the impacts are enormous, taking 
past experience of such accidents into consideration (see 4.7- Characteristic NASF accidents) 
 
Figure 4.10. Percentage of NASF, in which the ship broke in pieces. 
 3 out of 4 cases, in which the tanker broke in pieces, were the ones responsible for 96% 
(166983 tons out of 174039 t in total) of the total environmental pollution caused by NASF 
during the studied period. The fourth case is one of an unloaded tanker and thus caused 
minor environmental pollution. 
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Table 4.2. Various outcomes  
 yes no 
Towed away? 6% 94% 
Sailed by her means? 91% 9% 
Sold for demolition? 1% 99% 
Broken up? 3% 97% 
Ship other transfer? 1% 99% 
Ship internal transfer? 1% 99% 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Percentage of NASF accidents, that affected ship’s floatability. 
LOWI could have occurred, but it was not that serious, in order to endanger ship’s 
floatability.  
 
Figure 4.12. Distribution of NASF by degree of severity. 
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Figure 4.13. Distribution of  serious NASF by degree of severity. 
 
Figure 4.14. Nature of NASF. Ship’s part damaged. Unknown cases excluded. 
We don’t possess data for 33 of the cases (23%). It is not easy to draw conclusions without 
distinguishing between different hull types. Therefore this category will be examined with 
more details subsequently. 
Table 4.3. Various outcomes per decade of built. 
  ship's part damaged   other outcomes     
decade of  
built Hull Deck  Internal 
unknown 
cases LOWI serious 
average age of 
NASF 
total 
cases 
1950's  0%  0% 100% 0 100% 0% 37 1 
1960's 100%  0%  0% 0 100% 100% 24 2 
1970's 74% 8% 18% 24 54% 27% 17,1 90 
1980's 62% 4% 34% 2 71% 46% 12,9 28 
1990's 50% 25% 25% 4 56% 40% 5,4 16 
serious 
92% 
total loss 
8% serious accidents 
Deck damage 
9% 
Hull damage 
68% 
Internal 
23% 
Nature of NASF 
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2000's 67% 16% 17% 3 56% 78% 3,9 9 
 
The most striking finding of the analysis in Table 4.3 is the relationship between NASF and 
the average ship age. It gets smaller and smaller over the years, meaning that more young 
ships are engaged in NASF. Although the small average age in which NASF occurred is trivial 
for tankers built in 2000’s (as they could not have a great average age), that is not the case 
for tankers built in 1990’s. They present a really small average age of 5.4 years for the 
occurrence of NASF. Note that out of the 16 large tankers, that were built during the 1990’s, 
10 were built in South Korea,3 in Japan,1 in China and 2 in Spain. 
Unfortunately, there is no data available for the distribution of fleet at risk by year of built, 
in order to calculate the frequencies of occurrence. 
4.1.3 Fatalities, injuries 
There were two fatalities in total resulting from NASF. In particular both fatalities happened 
in the same accident. 3 men were washed across deck (2 dead, 1 not seriously injured), 
while lashing survival rafts during a force 11 storm. Later cracks were discovered in deck 
plating. It could be said, that there is no real connection between the death of two members 
of the crew and the NASF, as it was not so, that the NASF led to the fatalities. It could be 
considered as an occupational accident. 
The conclusion can be drawn, that NASF don’t possess a big threat for life. The frequency is 
5,65x10-5 fatalities per shipyear.  
4.1.4 Oil spill information 
 
Figure 4.15. Percentage of NASF, that led to environmental pollution. 
There are 39 cases of NASF which led to environmental pollution. Total oil spilled is 174039 
tonnes.  
pollution  
27% 
no pollution 
73% 
NASF leading to environmental 
pollution 
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The negative picture of NASF accidents is mainly formed by a few environmentally 
catastrophic accidents and not by many accidents, which caused minor pollution. 3 accidents 
are responsible for 96% of the total environmental pollution in tonnes  caused by NASF.  
 
  
Figure 4.16. Percentage of spilled oil (in tonnes), that was recovered from sea. 
In particular 14328 tonnes of oil were recovered. 
 
Figure 4.17. Origin of pollution among the ship. 
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Figure 4.18. Environmental pollution. Yearly spill tone rate. 
The 3 peaks represent the 3 worst accidents that led to significant environmental pollution. 
 
4.1.5 Shipyards, flags, classes 
Table 4.4. Class when accident occurred 
class 
 
cases 
American Bureau of Shipping 
 
13 
Bureau Veritas 
 
1 
Det Norske Veritas 
 
4 
Lloyds Register 
 
3 
Hellenic Register of Shipping 
 
1 
Total cases 
 
22 
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Table 4.5. Class when ship was built 
class cases 
American Bureau of Shipping 4 
Det Norske Veritas 2 
Lloyds Register 2 
Registro Italiano 0 
Total cases 8 
 
We possess data for very few cases and thus it is problematic to draw conclusions. 
Table 4.6. Shipyard (country) of built for tankers, that presented NASF. 
Shipyard (country) 
 
cases 
China 
 
4 
Croatia 
 
1 
Denmark 
 
4 
Sweden 
 
19 
Japan 
 
48 
Korea (South) 
 
26 
United States of America 
 
22 
Spain 
 
11 
Canada 
 
1 
Belgium 
 
1 
Poland 
 
2 
France 
 
1 
Italy 
 
1 
United Kingdom 
 
2 
Netherlands 
 
1 
Finland 
 
1 
Norway 
 
1 
Total cases 
 
146 
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Figure 4.19. Distribution by shipyard (country) of built for tankers, that presented NASF. 
Table 4.7. Information about mostly represented shipyards (countries), where tankers, that 
presented NASF, were built. 
Shipyard 
(country) 
cases serious Broken 
in 
pieces 
LOWI Deck 
damage 
Hull 
damage 
Internal 
damage 
Average 
ship’s 
age(when 
accident 
occurred) 
Japan 48 31% 4,2% 62,5% 6,3% 62,5% 8,3% 15,8 
Korea(South) 26 38,5% 3,8% 46,2% 11,5% 30,8% 26,9% 8,5 
China 4 50% 0% 25% 0% 25% 0% 3,25 
Sweden 19 31,6% 0% 68,4% 0% 63,2% 10,5% 16 
Spain 11 54,5% 9,1% 63,6% 9,1% 45,5% 18,2% 14,5 
U.S.A.-Canada 23 21,7% 0% 69,6% 8,7% 65,2% 21,7% 19,1 
TOTAL 146 35% 3% 59% 9% 68% 23% 14,4 
 
Large Tankers built in China and South Korea present a small average age, at which a NASF 
occurred. The sample for tankers built in China is really small, but indicative of probable 
problems. Surprisingly 2 of those tankers (built in China) were only 1 year old, when NASF 
occurred. 
 
Table 4.8. Flag, when ship was built 
Flag cases 
Bahamas 3 
Bermuda 1 
Cyprus 1 
Greece 2 
Japan 
33% 
Korea (South) 
18% 
China 
3% 
Sweden 
13% 
Denmark- 
Finland- 
Norway 
4% 
Spain 
7% 
Rest of 
Europe 
6% 
U.S.A.- Canada 
16% 
Tankers with NASF-distribution by country 
of built 
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India 1 
Italy 0 
Liberia 10 
Marshall Islands 1 
Norway 1 
Norway(NIS) 3 
Panama 5 
Qatar 1 
Singapore 2 
Sweden 1 
U.S.A 3 
USSR 1 
Venezuela 1 
Total cases 37 
 
 
Table 4.9. Flag, when NASF occurred.  
Flag cases   
Panama 31 Gibraltar 2 
Australia 3 Isle Of Man 1 
Bahamas 10 Libya 3 
Bermuda 2 Malaysia 1 
Bermuda(British) 1 Norway(NIS) 7 
Cyprus 5 Norway 2 
France(FIS) 1 Philippines 1 
Greece 16 Portugal(MAR) 2 
Liberia 29 Qatar 1 
Malta 6 Singapore 4 
Marshall Islands 5 Sweden 1 
Mauritius 1 TAAF 1 
India 1 Tuvalu 1 
Iran 2 U.S.A. 1 
Iraq 1 Venezuela 1 
Kuwait 2 Total 145 
 
Flags mostly represented are:1)Panama-21,2%,2)Liberia-19,9%,3)Greece-11%,4)Bahamas-
6,8%,5)Norway(NIS),6)4,8%,7)Malta-4,1%,8)Marshall Islands-3,4%,9)Cyprus-3,4% 
There are 6 cases with pollution over 50 t. Three of them had the flag of Malta, 1 of Iran, 1 of 
Greece and 1 of the Bahamas. 
 
NOTE: No data for 1 
case 
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Figure 4.20. Flag, when NASF occurred and when the ship was built. Do they belong to TOP 
11 FOC (Flags Of Convenience)? 
 
TOP 11 Flags Of Convenience –according to world fleet in 2009 (merchant ships in general-
not only large tankers) in DWT-are: Panama, Malta, St. Vincent, Liberia, Cyprus, France FIS, 
Marshall Is., Antigua, Cayman Islands, Bahamas, Bermuda. They account for almost 55% of 
the entire world fleet as of 2009(independently of ship type, DWT over 1000t) .It is worth 
noting that ships registered under flags of Panama, Malta, St. Vincent, Antigua, Cayman 
Islands, Bahamas are in US target list, as far as Port State targeting is concerned(as of 2009). 
 
Definition of Flag Of Convenience: 1)the flag of such countries whose law allows - and 
indeed makes it easy - for ships owned by foreign nationals or companies to fly those flags in 
contrast to the practice in the maritime countries where the right to fly the national flag is 
subject to stringent conditions and involves far reaching obligations". 2) The business 
practice of registering a merchant ship in a sovereign state different from that of the ship's 
owners, and flying that state's civil ensign on the ship. Ships are registered under flags of 
convenience to reduce operating costs or avoid the regulations of the owner's country. 
The most important reason, why so many ships operate under a FOC, is the reduction of 
crewing costs. The difference in crew cost between a traditional registered ship and an open 
registered ship(means: belonging to a FOC)  is small but vital for competitiveness in the 
shipping market. 
An example, that makes clear why FOC are so popular among shipowners could be seen by 
the operation of a modern VLCC-tanker under Swedish and Liberian flags. The difference in 
crew costs is estimated at 6-8 million SEK or 7-9 hundred thousand Euro per year. (Spruf, J., 
Ship Management, 1994). Another example of cost saving can be found comparing 
European, Indian and Chinese crews on a similar ship. On a vessel of 24 crew members 
where the crew consists of Northern Europeans, 10 officers and 14 unlicensed seafarers, the 
monthly cost is $80,000. Where the same ration crew is Indian, the monthly cost is $41,000. 
Yes 
61% 
No 
39% 
casualties flag-
Belongs to TOP 11 
FOC? 
Yes 
57% 
No 
43% 
Flag built-Belongs to 
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Where the same ration crew is Chinese, the monthly cost is just $21,900. The difference 
between the Chinese crew and the Northern European crew is $58,000 per month and 
$698,400 per year.  
There is growing concern, that crew employed under a FOC is insufficiently skilled and 
trained in a lot of cases, something that of course influences negatively a ship’s operation, 
increasing the chances of an accident. That applies also for NASF. Possible crew errors that 
could lead to a NASF (not independently in most cases) include loading mistakes and voyage 
planning mistakes. In general, it seems logical, that an inadequately trained crew could not 
cope with an emergency situation as well as a skilled one. 
 
4.1.6 Frequencies 
 
Figure 4.21. NASF frequency per shipyear.  
 
According to this diagram there is an obvious tendency: NASF frequency has been 
significantly decreased during the last 23 years. This can be attributed to the introduction of 
a series of regulatory measures, changes in ship design and technology and overall 
improvement of the safety culture of the maritime industry.3  
 
                                                          
3 A. Papanikolaou, E. Eliopoulou, “Impact of ship age on tanker accidents”, Proceedings of 
the 2nd Int. Symposium on “Ship Operations, Management and Economics”, Athens, Sep. 
17-18, 2008 
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The eye-catching peak in 1990 could not be fully explained, but here is some data 
concerning these 39 cases:  
 16 out of 39 cases concern VLCC. 9 of them were built in Japan during 1973 and 
1977. The average age of NASF for 14 out of these 16 accidents is 15 years.  
 Hull type: 1 DH, 8 non DH and unknown for 30/39. Judging by the average age of 
NASF for these 30 cases (14,6 years) and the year of built (between 1971 and 1981), 
one could assume, that most of them are non DH. 
Table 4.10. Annual number of NASF and degree of severity. 
year accidents serious 
non 
serious 
1990 39 9 30 
1991 21 5 16 
1992 8 2 6 
1993 8 2 6 
1994 9 4 5 
1995 10 0 10 
1996 5 1 4 
    1997 3 1 2 
1998 8 2 6 
1999 3 1 2 
2000 8 7 1 
2001 1 0 0 
2002 3 0 0 
2003 5 5 0 
2004 2 1 0 
2005 3 3 0 
2006 1 1 0 
2007 4 4 0 
2008 1 0 1 
2009 2 1 1 
2010 1 1 0 
2011 1 1 0 
  146 51 90 
 
Table 4.11. Frequency of NASF in total, serious NASF and non serious NASF for studied 
period per shipyear. 
 Frequency per shipyear 
NASF  
 
4,124x10-3 
non serious NASF  2,542x10-3 
serious NASF  1,412x10-3 
 
NOTE: 5 accidents are not 
characterized as serious or non 
serious 
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Figure 4.22. Frequency of NASF, that led to environmental pollution per shipyear. 
1998 and 2000 are the years, that present peaks, as far as frequency and not amount of 
spilled oil is concerned. It is also worth noting, that there was no environmental pollution, 
caused by a NASF, from 2008 to 2011. 
High frequency in the figure above does not necessarily mean that a big amount of oil was 
released to the sea. The negative picture of NASF accidents is mainly formed by a few 
environmentally catastrophic accidents and not by many accidents, which caused minor 
pollution. Figure 4.18 supports this statement. 
 
Table 4.12. Frequency of NASF, that led to environmental pollution per shipyear. Tonnes of 
spilled oil annually. 
year cases frequency oil spilled(t) 
1990 2 1,575E-03 34,134 
1991 2 1,526E-03 17984 
1992 2 1,469E-03 72001 
1993 1 7,208E-04 5 
1994 4 2,854E-03 2046,5 
1995 2 1,447E-03 3,676 
1996 2 1,435E-03 1,05 
1997 2 1,424E-03 1,5 
1998 6 4,183E-03 12,84 
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1999 2 1,359E-03 2 
2000 6 4,087E-03 357,103 
2001 0 0,000E+00 0 
2002 2 1,364E-03 77000,1 
2003 2 1,319E-03 4579 
2004 2 1,273E-03 2 
2005 1 5,998E-04 1 
2006 0 0,000E+00 0 
2007 1 5,263E-04 8,5 
2008 0 0,000E+00 0 
2009 0 0,000E+00 0 
2010 0 0,000E+00 0 
2011 0 0,000E+00 0 
TOTAL 39 1,101E-03 174039,403 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Focusing on the basic hull type 
  The sample consists of 22 double hull tankers and 39 non double hull tankers. Basic hull 
type is unknown for 85/146 NASF cases, reaching a percentage of 58,2%. Therefore, one 
should be really careful, when trying to generalize after studying this rather small sample. 
 
Figure 4.23. Annual number of NASF. Focus on basic hull type. 
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Figure 4.24. Group ages of large tankers involved in NASF. Focus on basic hull type 
It is clear that double hull tankers are younger than non double hull ones. That does not 
mean, that DH are more likely to suffer a NASF (as frequencies are not taken into 
consideration in this part), but reflects mostly the gradual change from non DH designs to 
DH. At first glance it seems remarkable, that 56% of the DH tankers, that suffered a NASF, 
were 0 to 5 years old, but study of frequencies will help us draw more precise conclusions, 
although it seems quite problematic, that so young ships suffered a NASF.  Furthermore, it 
should be noted that differences between DH and non DH designs should be studied 
carefully, as the ship types are of different average age. DH fleet is younger than non DH 
fleet. Older ships are more vulnerable to corrosion, fatigue etc. Once more it should be 
noted , that the sample is small, something that affects the results.  
 
Figure 4.25. Distribution of NASF by ship’s size. Focus on hull type. 
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Figure 4.26. Distribution of fleet at risk by ship’s size. Focus on basic hull type.  
DH Panamax, non DH Aframax and DH Suezmax are represented more Figure  4.25 
“Distribution of NASF by ship’s size” than in Figure 4.26 “Distribution of fleet at risk by ship’s 
size”.  That could indicate, that they have a higher risk of suffering a NASF,  but frequencies 
will let us draw more precise conclusions.  
Some statistics regarding them:1)DH Panamax, that suffered a NASF (6 cases)-3 built in 
China, 2 in South Korea, 1 in Croatia with an average age of 4,5 years.2) non DH Aframax (21 
cases)- 9 built in Japan with an average age of 13,1 years, 5 in USA with an average age of 
21,6, 6 in South Korea with an average age of 12,8 and 1 in Poland , 3)DH Suezmax (8 cases)-
5 built in South Korea with an average age of 3,2 years, 3 built elsewhere(USA, Spain) with 
an average age of 13 years. 
Each ship size will be examined independently in chapter 4.3.  
Once more frequencies are of greater significance in compared to just percentages. The 
point here is to just draw a general picture. 
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4.2.1 Event location, ship operation, environment     
        
                                         
Figure 4.27. Event location (unknown cases excluded). Focus on hull type. 
Unknown cases : 0 out of 22(9%,DH), 13/39(33,3% non DH) 
As expected perhaps, results for event location are similar for both hull types and thus the 
only conclusion that can be drawn is that large tankers are most likely to suffer a NASF, while 
in open sea or terminal waters.(possible reasons already discussed)  
 
Figure 4.28. Operating condition (unknown cases excluded). Focus on basic hull type and 
ship’s size. 
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Unknown cases: a)DH-3/22(13,6%), b)non DH 16/39(41%). 
 
Unknown cases:14/22(63,6%)                              Unknown cases:24/39(61,5%) 
Figure 4.29. Loading condition. Unknown cases excluded. Focus on basic hull type. 
As far as loading condition is concerned, it seems clear, that loading condition can be a 
contributing factor for NASF, although ships are theoretically designed to be safe and stable 
independently of loading condition.  
 
Figure 4.30. Weather. Focus on basic hull type. 
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Table 4.13. Event location, where bad weather was encountered. Focus on basic hull type. 
Event location DH non DH 
Open sea 5 8 
terminal 0 0 
congested 2 0 
unknown 0 3 
Bad weather condition cases  7 11 
 
 
4.2.2 Outcome of event  
 
Figure 4.31. Percentage of NASF accidents, that led to LOWI. Focus on basic hull type. 
Although the sample is not big , non DH ships seem to be more vulnerable to LOWI than DH. 
The fact, that non DH ships present LOWI at such a large percentage could be justified by the 
fact, that non DH ships are older and thus for a larger period of time subjected to corrosion, 
fatigue etc. Average age, at which non DH ships presented LOWI is 14,3 years. The previous 
argument should not be that strong, taking into account the fact, that ships are 
(theoretically)  designed for a greater economic lifecycle than that, at which non DH tankers 
suffered LOWI. 
DH tankers present a smaller percentage of LOWI occurrence. However, the average age of 
the DH tankers, that presented LOWI is really small (4 years!!), something indicative of poor 
quality of structure. Some statistics regarding these 7 cases (DH tankers, that presented 
LOWI): built between 1992 and 2006, 4 in South Korea, 1 in Japan, in China and in Croatia. 
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Figure 4.32. Percentage of NASF, in which the ship broke in pieces. Focus on basic hull type. 
The two out of 3 cases in total, in which a non DH large tanker broke in pieces, are the 
infamous accidents of Prestige and Katina P (see chapter 4.7 for more details regarding 
these accidents). The 3rd tanker was not loaded. 
Table 4.14. Various outcomes. Focus on basic hull type. 
 Double Hull Non Double Hull 
 yes no yes no 
Towed away? 9% 91% 5% 95% 
Sailed by her 
means? 
86% 14% 90% 10% 
Remains afloat? 100% 0% 92% 8% 
Sold for 
demolition? 
0% 100% 0% 100% 
Broken up? 0% 100% 3% 97% 
Ship other 
transfer? 
5% 95% 0% 100% 
Ship internal 
transfer? 
0% 100% 3% 97% 
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Figure 4.33. Distribution of NASF by degree of severity. Focus on basic hull type. 
The chart above could be misleading. The frequencies at which DH and non DH NASF are 
characterized as serious are comparable. Remarkably that is not the case for accidents being 
characterized as non serious. There a growing tension of characterizing more easily an 
accident as serious over time or-to rephrase it- more rarely is an accident characterized as 
non serious nowadays. In the period 2001-2011 only two NASF have been considered as non 
serious.(out of 24 in total during the same period).  To summarize, two similar accidents 
could be characterized with different degrees of severity only because they happened in 
different decades (for example) and not because the one had worst consequences than the 
other. 
  
 
Figure 4.34. Distribution of serious NASF by severity level. Focus on basic hull type. 
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Figure 4.35. Nature of NASF. Ship’s part damaged. Unknown cases excluded. Focus on basic 
hull type. 
Unknown cases: a) DH-6/22 (27,3%), b) non DH- 9/39 (23,1%). 
It is worth noting, that DH tankers present mostly internal structural problems, while non DH 
tankers present mostly hull problems. Arguments  that justify this are:  
1) Double hull tankers operate with global stress levels some 30% higher than those with 
single hulls, because of the uniform distribution of cargo and ballast over the length of the 
ship. In a single hull tanker, the ballast tanks can be positioned to minimize longitudinal 
bending and shear stresses, resulting in values well below the acceptable maximum.  
2) Structures of ballast spaces in double hull tankers are more susceptible to fractures and 
minor failures as compared to single hull tankers .Corrosion is considered one of the main 
reasons for failure of hull structures in tankers. Improper maintenance of ballast tank 
structures and failure to maintain the integrity of protective coating and cathodic 
protection in ballast tanks have lead to structural failure in the past. In double hull tankers, 
the surface area of the tanks is more than double than that of single hull tanks. Thus they 
require more maintenance during the operating life. 
3) Non DH tankers are older and so subjected to corrosion, fatigue, (possibly to)poor 
maintenance, etc.  to a greater extent than non DH tankers. They have also “simpler” 
internal designs and thus they present more often structural problems in their outer part, 
that means their hull. 
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4.2.3 Fatalities, injuries 
As already discussed, there were two deaths and 1 non serious injury, resulting from a NASF 
(although it could be considered as an occupational accident). These happened on board of 
the same ship-and same accident- , whose hull type in unknown. Practically the frequency of 
fatalities, because of NASF-DH and non DH-, is 0, although it is not really so. It is obvious 
though, that fortunately NASF possess only very rarely danger for human life.  
 
4.2.4 Oil spill information 
 
Figure 4.36. Percentage of NASF, that led to environmental  pollution. Focus on basic hull 
type. 
  
Figure 4.37. Origin of pollution among the ship for non DH tankers. 
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This seems logical, as cargo tanks cover a greater part of ship than fuel tanks. Additionally, 
this chart implies the need for change and evolution, as far as hull designs are concerned. 
Penetration of cargo tanks could cause enormous environmental pollution and thus non DH 
designs are insufficient. DH designs are not necessarily the solution, but are one step 
forward towards environmentally friendly transportation of oil across the sea. 
 
4.2.5 Shipyards, flags, classes 
Table 4.15. Class, when NASF occurred. Focus on basic hull type. 
Class DH Non DH 
American Bureau of Shipping 9 3 
Bureau Veritas 1 0 
Det Norske Veritas 4 0 
Lloyds Register 1 2 
Hellenic Register of Shipping 0 1 
 TOTAL 15 6 
 
Table 4.16. Class, when ship was built. Focus on basic hull type. 
Class DH Non DH 
American Bureau of Shipping 4 0 
Det Norske Veritas 2 0 
Lloyds Register 1 1 
Registro Italiano 0 0 
 TOTAL 7 1 
 
The sample is unfortunately small and so it is difficult to draw safe conclusions. However, 
there are some facts worth noting. 
The two more catastrophic NASF, that led to the greatest environmental pollution (accidents 
of tankers PRESTIGE and KATINA P) were single hull tankers. The first was classed by ABS and 
the second by Hellenic Register of Shipping, by the time the accident occurred. 
A key issue raised by the PRESTIGE accident was whether classification societies can be held 
responsible for the consequences of accidents, that lead to environmental pollution. After a 
series of trials the court decided that there was no existing precedent to assign a duty on 
behalf of the coastal state. ABS was free of any sanctions.ABS had certified the Prestige as 
"in class" for its final voyage. The "in class" status states that the vessel is in compliance with 
all applicable rules and laws, not that it is or is not safe. Anyway it would be problematic to 
assume that classification societies have nothing to do with structural deficiencies of ships, 
as classification societies by definition are the ones responsible for establishing and 
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maintaining technical standards for the construction and operation of ships and offshore 
structures and also for carrying out regular surveys to ensure compliance with the standards. 
Somebody should be responsible for structural deficiencies and for the consequences, that 
result from them… 
Table 4.17. Shipyard (country) of built for tankers, that presented NASF. Focus on basic hull 
type. 
Shipyard (country) DH Non DH 
China 4 0 
Croatia 1 0 
Denmark 1 0 
Sweden 0 3 
Japan 1 14 
Korea (South) 11 12 
United States of America 2 7 
Spain 1 1 
   Canada 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 
Poland 1 1 
TOTAL 22 39 
 
Table 4.18. Information about mostly represented shipyards (countries), where tankers, that 
presented NASF, were built. DH tankers. 
DH cases serious Broken 
in 
pieces 
LOWI Deck 
damage 
Hull 
damage 
Internal 
damage 
Average 
ship’s 
age(when 
accident 
occurred) 
Japan 1 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 4 
Korea(South) 11 45,5% 0% 36,4% 27,3% 9,1% 36,4% 4,2 
China 4 50% 0% 25% 0% 25% 0% 3,25 
Sweden 0        
Spain 1 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 7 
U.S.A.-
Canada 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 16 
TOTAL* 22 55% 0% 32% 25% 25% 50% 6,2 
*all shipyards included, not only the ones in this table 
As already mentioned, the average age of large DH tankers, that suffered a NASF, is small 
(6,2 years old). After studying the table above, it becomes obvious, that most ships ,that 
suffered a NASF, were built in Japan, China and South Korea. That is not a surprising fact, as 
the vast majority of merchant is built in these 3 countries. Unfortunately, we possess no 
data, as far as fleet at risk by shipyard of built, is concerned. Nevertheless, structural failure 
at such a young age indicate problems, omissions and mistakes.  
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Table 4.19. Information about mostly represented shipyards (countries), where tankers, that 
presented NASF, were built. Non DH tankers. 
Non DH cases serious Broken 
in 
pieces 
LOWI Deck 
damage 
Hull 
damage 
Internal 
damage 
Average 
ship’s 
age(when 
accident 
occurred) 
Japan 14 28,6% 14,3% 78,6% 7,1% 64,3% 7,1% 14,1 
Korea(South) 12 41,7% 8,3% 66,7% 0% 58,3% 25% 10,7 
China 0        
Sweden 3 33,3% 0% 33,3% 0% 0% 0% 17 
Spain 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 7 
U.S.A.-
Canada 
7 28,6% 0% 71,4% 28,6% 71,4% 0% 19,4 
TOTAL* 39 31% 8% 69% 10% 73% 17% 13,8 
*all shipyards included, not only the ones in this table 
Table 4.20. Flag when ship was built. Focus on basic hull type. 
Flag DH nonDH 
Bahamas 2 0 
Bermuda 1 0 
Cyprus 1 0 
Greece 1 1 
India 1 0 
Italy 0 0 
Liberia 9 1 
Marshall Islands 1 0 
Norway 1 0 
Norway(NIS) 1 2 
Panama 0 5 
Qatar 0 1 
Singapore 1 1 
Sweden 0 1 
U.S.A 2 0 
USSR 0 0 
Venezuela 0 1 
 Total cases 21 13 
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Figure 4.38. Flag when ship was built. Belongs to TOP 11 FOC? Focus on basic hull type. 
Table 4.21. Flag when NASF occurred. Focus on basic hull type. 
Flag DH Non DH 
Panama 2 11 
Australia 0 3 
Bahamas 1 1 
Bermuda 1 0 
Bermuda(British) 1 0 
Cyprus 0 2 
France(FIS) 1 0 
Greece 1 4 
Liberia 5 5 
Malta 0 2 
Marshall Islands 3 0 
Mauritius 0 0 
India 1 0 
Iran 0 0 
Iraq 0 0 
Kuwait 0 1 
Gibraltar 0 0 
Isle Of Man 0 0 
Libya 0 1 
Malaysia 0 1 
Norway(NIS) 2 1 
Norway 1 1 
Philippines 0 0 
Portugal (MAR) 0 0 
Qatar 0 1 
Singapore 2 2 
Sweden 0 1 
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TAAF 1 0 
Tuvalu 0 0 
U.S.A. 0 0 
Venezuela 0 1 
 TOTAL 22 38 
 
 
Figure 4.39. Flag when NASF occurred. Belongs to TOP 11 FOC? Focus on basic hull type. 
 
 
4.2.6 Frequencies 
 
Figure 4.40. NASF frequency per shipyear. Focus on basic hull type. 
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In order to understand the above chart, one should always keep in mind the annual change 
of DH and non DH fleet. For example in1990 DH NASF frequency is twice compared to the 
non DH NASF frequency. This great difference could be justified by the fact, that in 1990 
there was 1 DH NASF (fleet at risk: 66,1 shipyears), that means that the sample is very small 
and such sharp changes of values are expected. As DH fleet grows, no such sharp changes 
are noted. 
Furthermore the sudden peaks could also be justified by the small sample. 
 
Figure 4.41. Frequency of non serious NASF per shipyear. Focus on basic hull type. 
 
Figure 4.42. Frequency of serious NASF per shipyear. Focus on basic hull type. 
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The trend is that more accidents are characterized as serious over time. In the period 2001-
2011 only two NASF are characterized as non serious.(out of 24 in total during the same 
period) 
 
Table 4.22. Annual number of NASF and degree of severity. Focus on basic hull type. 
 
DH DH 
 
DH Non DH 
Non 
DH 
 
Non DH 
 year accidents serious  
non  
serious accidents serious  
non  
serious 
1990 1 0 
 
1 8 0 
 
8 
1991 0 0 
 
0 4 0 
 
4 
1992 0 0 
 
0 2 1 
 
1 
1993 1 0 
 
1 1 0 
 
1 
1994 2 1 
 
1 1 0 
 
1 
1995 2 0 
 
2 3 0 
 
3 
1996 2 0 
 
2 0 0 
 
0 
1997 0 0 
 
0 3 1 
 
2 
1998 1 0 
 
1 3 1 
 
2 
1999 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
 
0 
2000 1 1 
 
0 5 4 
 
1 
2001 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
 
0 
2002 0 0 
 
0 3 0 
 
0 
2003 1 1 
 
0 2 2 
 
0 
2004 0 0 
 
0 2 1 
 
0 
2005 3 3 
 
0 0 0 
 
0 
2006 1 1 
 
0 0 0 
 
0 
2007 3 3 
 
0 1 1 
 
0 
2008 1 0 
 
1 0 0 
 
0 
2009 1 0 
 
1 1 1 
 
0 
2010 1 1 
 
0 0 0 
 
0 
2011 1 1 
 
0 0 0 
 
0 
TOTAL 22 12 
 
10 39 12 
 
23 
 
Table 4.23. Frequency of NASF in total, serious NASF and non serious NASF for studied 
period per shipyear. Focus on basic hull type. 
 DH Non DH 
NASF frequency per shipyear 
 
1,16x10-3 2,37x10-3 
Frequency of non serious NASF per 
shipyear 
5,28x10-4 1,4x10-3 
Frequency of serious NASF per shipyear 6.34x10-4 7,28x10-4 
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It should be again noted, that it is quite problematic to draw conclusions only by the 
frequencies above. The reason is that we have data for only 61 of the146 NASF cases, far as 
hull type is concerned. It is more “secure” and meaningful to observe the trends and not the  
values. 
 
Table 4.24. Frequency of NASF leading to environmental pollution. Tonnes of spilled oil in 
total. Focus on basic hull type. 
 cases Oil spilled (tones) frequency 
DH tankers 1 1 (assumed) 5,28x10-5 
Non DH tankers 16 149371 9,71x10-4 
 
According to these statistics non DH tankers are almost 20 times more likely to spill oil into 
the sea following a NASF. One should be really careful, because 1 DH tanker NASF leading to 
a great oil spillage could change this picture dramatically. Nevertheless, it does not go 
unnoticed, that tankers in general seem to become gradually environmentally friendlier with 
the introduction of DH design, although the problem is only partly solved (for example DH 
designs reduce environmental risk for low energy collision and groundings, but not for high 
energy ones. That extends beyond the limits of this thesis and will not be discussed further)   
Out of the 16 non DH tankers NASF oil spillage cases: 
 2 are responsible for 86% of total 174039 tonnes of oil spilled (as result of  NASF, 
including tankers with unknown hull type). 
 in 11 cases pollution was smaller than 1 t or assumed so. 
There are 22 cases of oil spillage, resulting in an environmental pollution of almost 24668 
tonnes, for which we possess no data regarding the hull type. 
 
Table 4.25. Frequency of NASF that led to environmental pollution per shipyear. Non DH 
tankers. 
 
year 
 
 
pollution  
cases fleet at risk 
 
Frequency per 
shipyear 
 
1990 
 
0 1204,12 
 
0,000E+00 
 
1991 
 
0 1218,44 
 
0,000E+00 
 
1992 
 
1 1218,56 
 
8,206E-04 
 
1993 
 
0 1178,52 
 
0,000E+00 
 
1994 
 
0 1147,09 
 
0,000E+00 
 
1995 
 
0 1095,71 
 
0,000E+00 
 
1996 
 
0 1062,78 
 
0,000E+00 
 
1997 
 
2 1030,72 
 
1,940E-03 
 
1998 
 
3 1005,51 
 
2,984E-03 
 
1999 
 
0 951,42 
 
0,000E+00 
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2000 
 
4 843,29 
 
4,743E-03 
 
2001 
 
0 791,61 
 
0,000E+00 
 
2002 
 
2 683,93 
 
2,924E-03 
 
2003 
 
1 586,68 
 
1,705E-03 
 
2004 
 
2 481,76 
 
4,151E-03 
 
2005 
 
0 426,24 
 
0,000E+00 
 
2006 
 
0 399,76 
 
0,000E+00 
 
2007 
 
1 364,89 
 
2,741E-03 
 
2008 
 
0 313,12 
 
0,000E+00 
 
2009 
 
0 236,86 
 
0,000E+00 
 
2010 
 
0 151,87 
 
0,000E+00 
 
2011 
 
0 87,16 
 
0,000E+00 
 
TOTAL 
 
16 16480,05 
 
9,709E-04 
 
 
 
Figure 4.43. Frequency of NASF, that led to environmental pollution per shipyear. Non DH 
tankers. 
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4.3. Focusing on ship’s size 
Table 4.26. Sample examined 
 Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
DH 6 6 8 2 0 
Non DH 4 21 6 7 1 
Unknown 
hulltype 
8 20 17 31 9 
Tota lcases 18 47 31 40 10 
 
Table 4.27. Group ages of large tankers involved in NASF. Focus on ship’s size. 
Ship’s age, when 
NASF occurred 
Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
0-5 16,7% 17% 16,1% 5% 0% 
6-10 27,7% 6,4% 6,4% 10% 0% 
11-15 11,1% 31,9% 32,3% 47,5% 30% 
16-20 27,7% 21,3% 35,5% 27,5% 60% 
>20 16,7% 23,4% 9,7% 10% 10% 
Total cases 18 47 31 40 10 
Average age 13,4 14,7 13,7 14,7 16,2 
 
 
Figure 4.44. Group ages of large tankers involved in NASF. Focus on ship’s size. 
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Only 5% of VLCC and no ULCC failed at an age less than 5 years. Contrariwise 16-17% of 
Panamax, Aframax and Suezmax, that presented a NASF, failed at an age 0-5 years. 
Furthermore, 44% of Panamax with NASF, were younger than 11 years. Some further 
statistics regarding those 3 ship’s sizes: 
-Panamax(0-5 years old):  
 2/3 built in China 
 2/3 classed by ABS, when NASF occurred 
-Panamax(6-10 years old) 
 2/5 built in South Korea, 2/5 in Japan, 1/5 in China 
 2/5 classed by ABS, when NASF occurred 
 2/5 flagged by Marshall Islands, when NASF occurred 
-Aframax(0-5 years old) 
 5/8 built in South Korea 
 2/8 classed by DNV, when NASF occurred 
 2/8 flagged by Australia, when NASF occurred 
-Suezmax(0-5years old) 
 5/5 built in South Korea 
 2/5 classed by ABS, when NASF occurred 
 4/5 flagged by Liberia, when NASF occurred 
ULCC NASF occur at a higher average age compared to the other large tanker’s types (sizes).  
Size relationship: As already mentioned in chapter 4.1, there is-maybe surprisingly- no 
obvious relation between ship’s size and NASF. There is one exception, that of ULCC. 
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4.3.1. Event location, ship operation, environment 
Table 4.28. Event location (unknown cases excluded). Focus on ship’s size. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
open sea 40,0% 41,2% 61,9% 74,1% 85,7% 
congested 20,0% 11,8% 19,0% 14,8% 0,0% 
terminal 33,3% 47,1% 19,0% 11,1% 14,3% 
limited waters 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
shipyards,drydocks 6,7% 0,0% 0 0,0 0,0 
Total cases(unknown cases excluded) 15 34 21 27 7 
unknown cases 3 13 10 13 3 
 
 
Open sea is the event location mostly represented in all large tankers sizes. Points to 
emphasize on after studying the above table: 
-Open sea is more frequently the event location of a NASF, as the ship’s size gets bigger. 74% 
of VLCC and 86% of ULCC NASF took place in open sea compared to 40% for Panamax and 
Aframax 
-The bigger the ship, the greater dimensional limitations of the port, river, canal etc it faces. 
In a lot of cases the largest of the large tanker unload their cargo far from the port. It seems 
logical, that no ULCC NASF event took place in congested waters. That’s not the case for 
example for a Panamax, which can operate without facing dimensional restrictions in the 
most cases in congested or limited waters. 
-NASF in terminal waters could be attributed mostly to loading/unloading mistakes. 
Table 4.29. Operating condition (unknown cases excluded). Focus on ship’s size. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
Sailing / En-route 57,1% 53,6% 88,2% 92,9% 100,0% 
Loading 7,1% 14,3% 11,8% 0,0% 0,0% 
Discharging 0,0% 14,3% 0,0% 3,6% 0,0% 
Berth 0,0% 3,6% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Port 0,0% 3,6% 0,0% 3,6% 0,0% 
Anch./Moor./Manoeuv. 28,6% 7,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Ballasting 0,0% 3,6% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Bunkering 7,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Unknown cases 4 19 14 12 3 
Total cases (unknown excluded) 14 28 17 28 7 
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Table 4.30. Loading condition (unknown cases excluded) 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
loaded 100,0% 88,2% 100,0% 91,7% 100,0% 
unloaded 0,0% 11,8% 0,0% 8,3% 0,0% 
Unknown cases 12 30 25 28 9 
Total cases (unknown excluded) 6 17 6 12 1 
 
It is obvious as a general comment, that a loaded tanker is more likely to suffer a NASF, than 
an unloaded one.. 
Table 4.33 Weather. Focus on ship’s size 
 
Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
bad  22,2% 17,0% 35,5% 50,0% 50,0% 
no data 77,8% 83,0% 64,5% 50,0% 50,0% 
total cases 18 47 31 40 10 
 
 
4.3.2. Outcome of event 
Table 4.31. Percentage of NASF accidents, that led to LOWI. Focus on ship’s size. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
Yes 83,3% 57,4% 58,1% 52,5% 50,0% 
No 16,7% 42,6% 41,9% 47,5% 50,0% 
Total cases 18 47 31 40 10 
Panamax present LOWI at 83,3%, a percentage significantly greater, than those of the other 
large tanker’s sizes. The causes are not clear. 
Table 4.32. Percentage of NASF, in which the ship broke in pieces. Focus on ship’s size. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
yes  5,6% 6,4% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
no 94,4% 93,6% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
total cases 18 47 31 40 10 
 
Table 4.33. Various outcomes. Focus on ship’s size. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
Towed away 11,1% 6,4% 3,2% 5,0% 10,0% 
Sailed by her means 83,3% 91,5% 90,3% 95,0% 90,0% 
Remains afloat 94,4% 95,7% 100,0% 97,5% 100,0% 
Sold for demolition 0,0% 2,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
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Broken up 0,0% 4,3% 0,0% 5,0% 0,0% 
Ship other transfer 0,0% 2,1% 0,0% 2,5% 0,0% 
Ship internal transfer 0,0% 2,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Total cases 18 47 31 40 10 
 
There are no points to emphasize on after studying the table above. The outcomes of the 
accidents seem similar at least for these categories.  
Table 4.34. Distribution of NASF by degree of severity. Focus on ship’s size. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
serious 50,0% 42,6% 19,4% 32,5% 30,0% 
non serious 50,0% 51,1% 74,2% 67,5% 70,0% 
Unknown 0,0% 6,4% 6,5% 0,0% 0,0% 
total 18 47 31 40 10 
 
Table 4.35. Distribution of serious NASF by degree of severity. Focus on ship’s size. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
serious  88,9% 95,0% 100,0% 84,6% 100,0% 
total loss 11,1% 5,0% 0,0% 15,4% 0,0% 
Total serious cases 9 20 6 13 3 
 
Table 4.36. Nature of NASF. Ship’s part damaged. Focus on ship’s size. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
Deck damage 5,6% 10,6% 9,7% 0,0% 10,0% 
Hull damage 66,7% 51,1% 45,2% 55,0% 50,0% 
Internal 11,1% 21,3% 25,8% 12,5% 10,0% 
Unknown damage 16,7% 17,0% 19,4% 32,5% 30,0% 
Total cases 18 47 31 40 10 
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Figure 4.45. Nature of NASF. Ship’s part damaged. Unknown cases excluded.  Focus on ship’s 
size. 
 
It could be misleading to draw conclusions according to the chart above although it provides 
us with a first overview. As already discussed, DH designs present mostly internal damages, 
whereas non DH designs mostly hull damages. Also it should be noted, that we do not 
possess data, as far as hull type is concerned, for 58% of NASF. The sample is not 
homogenous, even if unknown cases are excluded, as there are different percentages of DH, 
non DH and unknown hull types for each large tanker’s size. 
Nevertheless, some findings of the charts above are: 
-If we take for granted that non DH designs present mostly hull damages and DH designs 
internal damages, then we could assume that the ships with unknown hull type are mostly 
non DH designs. That’s because hull damages are greatly represented in the above chart. 
Also 75/104 large tankers with NASF and unknown hull type were built in the 1970’s, 
something that indicates, that we have to do mainly with non DH designs.  
-Hull damages are the category mostly represented for all ship sizes. Suezmax is the ship size 
with the greatest percentage, as far as internal damages are concerned. 
4.3.3. Fatalities, injuries 
As mentioned,  there were two fatalities in total, which resulted from NASF. It could be 
considered as an occupational accident. The accident happened on a 24 year old Panamax 
tanker. 
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4.3.4. Oil spill information 
 
Figure 4.46. Origin of pollution among the ship. Focus on ship’s size. 
 
 
Figure 4.47. Percentage of NASF, that led to environmental pollution. Focus on ship’s size. 
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Figure 4.48. Distribution of total environmental pollution (percentage of spilled oil in tonnes) 
by ship’s size. 
 
 
Figure 4.49. Environmental pollution. Yearly spill tone rate. Focus on ship’s size. 
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4.3.5. Shipyards, flags, classes 
Table 4.37. Class ,when accident occurred. Focus on ship’s size. 
 class Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
American Bureau of Shipping 4 2 4 3   
Bureau Veritas       1   
Det Norske Veritas 1 2 1     
Lloyds Register 1   1 1   
Hellenic Register of Shipping 1         
 
Table 4.38. Class, when ship was built. Focus on ship’s size. 
 class Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
American Bureau of Shipping 2   1 1   
Det Norske Veritas 1 1       
Lloyds Register 1     1   
 
The sample in the tables above is very small and thus no logical conclusions can be drawn. 
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Figure 4.50. Shipyard (country) of built for tankers, that presented NASF. Focus on ship’s 
size. 
NOTE: In “OTHER” are included countries, where no more than 2 large tankers, that suffered 
a NASF, were built (Croatia, Canada, Belgium, Poland, Finland, Netherlands, France, Italy, 
Norway, United Kingdom). 
 
Table 4.39. Shipyard (country) of built for tankers, that presented NASF. Focus on ship’s size. 
 
Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
China 3 1       
Croatia 1         
Denmark   1   2 1 
Sweden   4 7 2 6 
Japan 11 16 3 15 3 
Korea (South) 2 9 6 9   
United States of America 1 9 8 4   
Spain   1 5 5   
Canada   1       
Belgium   1       
Poland   2       
Finland     1     
Netherlands       1   
France   1       
Italy   1       
Norway     1     
United Kingdom       2   
Total 18 47 31 40 10 
 
The charts above show a general picture. Subsequently will every shipyard- country be 
examined independently regarding its possible relation to NASF by ship’s size. 
 
Table 4.40.a. Information about mostly represented shipyards (countries), where PANAMAX, 
that presented NASF, were built. Focus on ship’s size. 
 
        ship's part damaged average age 
  cases serious 
broken in 
pieces LOWI hull deck internal 
(when NASF 
occurred) 
Japan 11 45,4% 9,1% 90,9% 81,8% 9,1% 9,1% 16 
Korea 
(South) 2 50,0% 0,0% 100,0% 50,0% 0,0% 0,0% 6 
China 3 66,7% 0,0% 33,3% 33,3% 0,0% 0,0% 4 
USA 1 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 37 
Croatia 1 100,0% 0,0% 100,0% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 3 
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TOTAL 18 50,0% 5,6% 83,3% 66,7% 5,6% 11,1% 13,4 
The sample for Panamax tankers built in China, which presented NASF, is not big, but the 
average age, at which NASF occurred, is pretty small (4 years). Such a small average age 
could not be attributed to corrosion, which needs time to affect ship’s seaworthiness, but 
mostly to construction-manufacturing mistakes. To rephrase it, the ship was deficient, by the 
time it was built. 
Panamax built in Japan present mostly hull damage. 
Table 4.40.b. Information about mostly represented shipyards (countries), where AFRAMAX, 
that presented NASF, were built. Focus on ship’s size. 
 
        ship's part damaged average age  
  cases serious 
broken 
in pieces LOWI hull deck internal 
(when NASF 
occurred) 
 
 
Japan 16 31,3% 6,3% 68,8% 62,5% 6,3% 6,3% 14,9  
Korea(South) 9 55,6% 11,1% 33,3% 22,2% 11,1% 55,6% 9,1  
China 1 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 1  
USA 9 22,2% 0,0% 66,7% 66,7% 22,2% 11,1% 20  
Spain 1 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 22  
Sweden 4 75,0% 0,0% 75,0% 75,0% 0,0% 0,0% 16,3  
Denmark 1 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 16  
Canada 1 100,0% 0,0% 100,0% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 17  
Belgium 1 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 14  
Poland 2 50,0% 0,0% 50,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 10  
France 1 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 15  
Italy 1 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 21  
TOTAL 47 42,60% 6,40% 57,40% 51,10% 10,60% 21,30% 14,7  
 Aframax built in Japan present mostly hull damage, whereas those built in South Korea 
mainly internal damage. 
Aframax built in USA present a great average age, approaching their economic lifecycle. We 
could not necessarily  conclude, that USA built Aframax are of very good quality, as they 
presented a NASF, but we could assume, that the most possible reasons, why NASF in these 
occurred, has to do with wrong/inefficient surveys, inspections and maintenance. Ships are 
not built to last for 25 years or more without checking periodically and efficiently their 
seaworthiness and correcting deficiencies/omissions.  
Worth noting is also the case of one built in China Aframax, which presented a NASF at the 
age of  1 year! 
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Table 4.40.c. Information about mostly represented shipyards (countries), where SUEZMAX, 
that presented NASF, were built. Focus on ship’s size. 
 
        ship's part damaged average age  
  cases serious 
broken in 
pieces LOWI hull deck internal 
(when NASF 
occurred) 
 
 
Japan 3 0,0% 0,0% 66,7% 66,7% 0,0% 0,0% 16,7  
Korea 
(South) 6 0,0% 0,0% 50,0% 16,7% 33,3% 33,3% 5  
USA 8 12,5% 0,0% 62,5% 62,5% 0,0% 37,5% 17,3  
Spain 5 40,0% 0,0% 40,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 12,6  
Sweden 7 28,6% 0,0% 71,4% 57,1% 0,0% 14,3% 16,4  
Finland 1 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 12  
Norway 1 0,0% 0,0% 
100,0
% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 17  
TOTAL 31 19,40% 0% 
58,10
% 45,20% 9,70% 25,80% 13,7  
 
Suezmax built in South Korea present a small average age of failure, in contrast to USA built 
ones. 
Japan built Suezmax present mostly hull damage. That is the case also for Panamax, Aframax 
and VLCC tankers. 
USA built tankers have again the highest average age of NASF.  
 
 
Table 4.40.d. Information about mostly represented shipyards (countries), where VLCC, that 
presented NASF, were built. Focus on ship’s size. 
 
        ship's part damaged average age  
  cases serious 
broken in 
pieces LOWI hull deck internal 
(when NASF 
occurred) 
 
 
Japan 15 26,7% 0,0% 40,0% 60,0% 0,0% 6,7% 15,7  
Korea(South) 9 44,4% 0,0% 44,4% 44,4% 0,0% 0,0% 10,7  
USA 4 25,0% 0,0% 75,0% 75,0% 0,0% 0,0% 16,3  
Spain 5 60,0% 0,0% 80,0% 60,0% 0,0% 20,0% 14,8  
Sweden 2 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 50,0% 0,0% 50,0% 16,5  
Denmark 2 0,0% 0,0% 50,0% 50,0% 0,0% 50,0% 17,5  
Netherlands 1 100,0% 0,0% 100,0% 
100,0
% 0,0% 0,0% 13  
United 
Kingdom 2 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 50,0% 18,5  
TOTAL 40 32,50% 0% 52,50% 55% 0% 12,50% 14,7  
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Table 4.40.e. Information about mostly represented shipyards (countries), where ULCC, that 
presented NASF, were built. Focus on ship’s size. 
 
        ship's part damaged average age 
  cases serious broken in pieces LOWI hull deck internal (when NASF occurred) 
Japan 3 33,3% 0,0% 33,3% 0,0% 33,3% 33,3% 18,7 
Sweden 6 16,7% 0,0% 50,0% 66,7% 0,0% 0,0% 15 
Denmark 1 100,0% 0,0% 100,0% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 16 
TOTAL 10 30% 0% 50% 50% 10% 10% 16,2 
Although the frequency failure for ULCC is the greatest the average age  of failure is the 
biggest. All ULCC that failed were built between 1974 and 1978 and none of them failed at 
an age smaller than 13. 
 
 
 
Table 4.41. Flag, when ship was built. Does it belong to TOP 11 FOC? Focus on ship’s size. 
Flag Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
Bahamas   2     1 
Bermuda 1         
Cyprus 1         
Greece 1       1 
India     1     
Italy           
Liberia 2 1 5 2   
Marshall Islands   1       
Norway     1     
Norway(NIS)   3       
Panama 1 2 1 1   
Qatar   1       
Singapore 1 1       
Sweden       1   
U.S.A     2 1   
USSR   1       
Venezuela 1         
TOTAL 8 12 10 5 2 
belongs to top 11 
FOC*? 63% 50% 60% 60% 50% 
 
*TOP 11 Flags Of Convenience: Panama, Malta, St. Vincent, Liberia, Cyprus, France (FIS), 
Marshall Islands, Antigua, Cayman Islands, Bahamas, Bermuda. 
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Table 4.42. Flag, when NASF occurred. Does it belong to TOP 11 FOC? Focus on ship’s size. 
 
Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
Panama 3 12 8 7 1 
Australia   3       
Bahamas   5   3 2 
Bermuda 1     1   
Bermuda(British) 1         
Cyprus   4 1     
France(FIS)       1   
Greece 3 5 2 4 2 
Liberia 4 3 9 11 2 
Malta 2 3 1     
Marshall Islands 2 1   1 1 
Mauritius   1       
India     1     
Iran       2   
Iraq     1     
Kuwait       1 1 
Gibraltar       2   
Isle Of Man       1   
Libya     3     
Malaysia   1       
Norway(NIS)   5   1 1 
Norway     2     
Philippines       1   
Portugal(MAR)     1 1   
Qatar   1       
Singapore 1 1   2   
Sweden       1   
TAAF   1       
Tuvalu     1     
U.S.A.     1     
Venezuela 1         
TOTAL 18 46 31 40 10 
belongs to top 11 FOC? 66,70% 60,90% 58,10% 60% 60% 
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4.3.6 Frequencies 
Table 4.43. Annual number and frequency of NASF (per shipyear). Focus on ship’s size. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC   ULCC   
year  cases frequency cases frequency cases frequency cases frequency cases frequency 
1990 4 2,03E-02 9 2,29E-02 7 2,91E-02 16 4,15E-02 3 5,56E-02 
1991 1 4,96E-03 9 2,17E-02 4 1,63E-02 6 1,52E-02 1 1,85E-02 
1992 3 1,52E-02 0 0,00E+00 2 7,51E-03 1 2,46E-03 2 3,70E-02 
1993 0 0,00E+00 3 6,63E-03 2 7,42E-03 2 4,84E-03 1 1,85E-02 
1994 0 0,00E+00 4 8,68E-03 1 3,71E-03 3 7,17E-03 1 1,85E-02 
1995 0 0,00E+00 4 8,64E-03 5 1,87E-02 0 0,00E+00 1 1,89E-02 
1996 0 0,00E+00 1 2,11E-03 2 7,59E-03 2 4,88E-03 0 0,00E+00 
1997 0 0,00E+00 2 4,14E-03 0 0,00E+00 1 2,42E-03 0 0,00E+00 
1998 2 1,03E-02 2 3,98E-03 2 7,33E-03 1 2,42E-03 1 1,92E-02 
1999 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 1 3,61E-03 2 4,82E-03 0 0,00E+00 
2000 0 0,00E+00 3 5,57E-03 2 7,44E-03 3 7,31E-03 0 0,00E+00 
2001 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 1 3,66E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2002 0 0,00E+00 2 3,67E-03 1 3,77E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2003 1 4,63E-03 3 5,16E-03 0 0,00E+00 1 2,37E-03 0 0,00E+00 
2004 0 0,00E+00 2 3,28E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2005 0 0,00E+00 2 3,12E-03 1 3,27E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2006 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 1 2,13E-03 0 0,00E+00 
2007 3 9,19E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 1 2,04E-03 0 0,00E+00 
2008 1 2,85E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2009 1 2,61E-03 1 1,21E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2010 1 2,53E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2011 1 2,47E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
TOTAL 18 3,30E-03 47 3,66E-03 31 4,72E-03 40 4,10E-03 10 1,29E-02 
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Figure 4.51.a. NASF frequency per shipyear for time period 1990-2000. Focus on ship’s size. 
 
Figure 4.51.b. NASF frequency per shipyear for time period 2001-2011. Focus on ship’s size. 
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The NASF frequency per shipyear for Panamax, Aframax, Suezmax, VLCC NASF frequency per 
shipyear ranges from 3,3 x10-3 to 4,72x10-3. ULCC present a significantly higher NASF 
frequency per shipyear (1,29 x10-2). That seems logical for reasons already discussed (ULCC 
are the largest of the large tankers and thus the developed stresses are greater in 
comparison to the other large tankers’ categories. As a result it is more likely, that structural 
overstressing occurs).  
Table 4.44. Annual number of NASF. Focus on ship’s size and severity level. 
  
Panama
x 
  
Aframa
x 
  
Suezma
x 
  
year cases 
seriou
s 
non 
serious cases 
seriou
s 
non 
serious cases 
seriou
s 
non 
serious 
1990 4 1 3 9 3 6 7 1 6 
1991 1 0 1 9 3 6 4 1 3 
1992 3 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 2 
1993 0 0 0 3 1 2 2 1 1 
1994 0 0 0 4 3 1 1 0 1 
1995 0 0 0 4 0 4 5 0 5 
1996 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 
1997 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 
1998 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
2000 0 0 0 3 3 0 2 2 0 
2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 
2003 1 1 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 
2005 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2010 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTA
L 18 9 9 47 20 24 31 6 23 
 
  VLCC 
  
ULCC     
year cases serious non serious cases serious non serious 
1990 16 2 14 3 2 1 
1991 6 1 5 1 0 1 
1992 1 0 1 2 0 2 
1993 2 0 2 1 0 1 
1994 3 1 2 1 0 1 
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1995 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1996 2 1 1 0 0 0 
1997 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1998 1 1 0 1 1 0 
1999 2 1 1 0 0 0 
2000 3 2 1 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2007 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 40 13 27 10 3 7 
 
 
Figure 4.52. Frequency of NASF per shipyear. Focus on ship’s size and severity level. 
ULCC present by far the highest severity per shipyear, although most of them are 
characterized as non serious. All ULCC failures took place till 1998. 
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Figure 4.53. Frequency of serious NASF per shipyear. Focus on ship’s size. 
 
 
Figure 4.54. Frequency of non serious NASF per shipyear. Focus on ship’s size. 
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Figure 4.55.a. Frequency of NASF, that led to environmental pollution per shipyear for 
studied period. Focus on ship’s size.  
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Figure 4.55.b. Frequency of NASF, that led to environmental pollution per shipyear. Focus on 
ship’s size. 
This distribution could easily change, if only one big NASF occurred.  Suezmax seem to be the 
most environmentally friendly tanker’s type, having the smallest pollution frequency and 
leading to “only” 336 t of oil spillage. ULCC are responsible for almost no oil spillage (1t , 
which was assumed) although their frequency is similar to these of the other tankers sizes. 
That is really encouraging, as the environmental consequences of a NASF of a loaded ULCC 
would be enormous. On the other side Aframax seem to be the least environmentally 
friendly ship’s size having the biggest frequency and leading to 99760t out of 174039t of 
total oil spillage caused by NASF, that means 57%. It should be noted though, that 95000t 
out of these 99760t were caused by only two NASF.         
Table 4.45. Annual number and frequency of NASF, that led to environment pollution. Focus 
on ship’s size. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC   ULCC   
year cases frequency cases frequency cases frequency cases frequency cases frequency 
1990 0 0,00E+00 1 2,54E-03 0 0,00E+00 1 2,60E-03 0 0,00E+00 
1991 0 0,00E+00 2 4,81E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
1992 2 1,02E-02 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
1993 0 0,00E+00 1 2,21E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
1994 0 0,00E+00 2 4,34E-03 0 0,00E+00 2 4,78E-03 0 0,00E+00 
1995 0 0,00E+00 1 2,16E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 1 1,89E-02 
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1996 0 0,00E+00 1 2,11E-03 0 0,00E+00 1 2,44E-03 0 0,00E+00 
1997 0 0,00E+00 1 2,07E-03 0 0,00E+00 1 2,42E-03 0 0,00E+00 
1998 2 1,03E-02 2 3,98E-03 1 3,66E-03 1 2,42E-03 0 0,00E+00 
1999 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 2 4,82E-03 0 0,00E+00 
2000 0 0,00E+00 1 1,86E-03 2 7,44E-03 3 7,31E-03 0 0,00E+00 
2001 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2002 0 0,00E+00 2 3,67E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2003 0 0,00E+00 1 1,72E-03 0 0,00E+00 1 2,37E-03 0 0,00E+00 
2004 0 0,00E+00 2 3,28E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2005 0 0,00E+00 1 1,56E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2006 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2007 1 3,06E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2008 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2009 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2010 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
2011 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 
TOTAL 5 9,16E-04 18 1,40E-03 3 4,57E-04 12 1,23E-03 1 1,29E-03 
 
 
 
 
4.4.Focusing on ship’s size and basic hull type 
 
Table 4.46. Sample examined 
 Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
DH 6 6 8 2 0 
nonDH 4 21 6 7 1 
Total(hull type 
known) 
10 27 14 9 1 
Total(independently 
of hull type) 
 
18 47 31 40 10 
 
NOTE:As seen above, the examined sample , when we take ship’s size and basic hull type 
into consideration, is really small. As far as ULCC are concerned, the sample is only one 
nonDH.  
One should be really careful, when trying to draw conclusions after studying such a small 
sample. 
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Table 4.47. Group ages of large tankers involved in NASF. Focus on ship’s size and hull type. 
  
Panama
x   
Aframa
x   
Suezma
x   
VLCC 
  
ULC
C   
  DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH DH 
non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH 
0-5 50,0% 0,0% 66,7% 19,0% 62,5% 0,0% 50,0
% 
14,3%  - 0,0% 
6-10 50,0% 50,0% 0,0% 14,3% 12,5% 16,7% 0,0% 42,9%  - 0,0% 
11-15 0,0% 0,0% 16,7% 19,0% 12,5% 50,0% 50,0
% 
28,6%  - 100,0% 
16-20 0,0% 25,0% 16,7% 19,0% 12,5% 16,7% 0,0% 14,3%  - 0,0% 
>20 0,0% 25,0% 0,0% 28,6% 0,0% 16,7% 0,0% 0,0%  - 0,0% 
Total 
cases 
6 4 6 21 8 
6 2 7  - 1 
Averag
e age 
4,5 15,8 6,2 14,7 6,9 
14,8 8,5 9,4  - 14 
 
DH fleet is younger than non DH fleet. Despite that, it still remains problematic that DH 
Panamax, Aframax and Suezmax failed at a small average age. As far as non DH tankers are 
concerned, VLCC failed at the smallest average age. 
4.4.1. Event location, ship operation, environment 
Table 4.48. Event location. Unknown cases excluded.Focus on ship’s size and basic hull type. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC   ULCC 
  DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH 
limited waters 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0 0 
open sea 
33,3
% 50,0% 
33,3
% 35,7% 
50,0
% 75,0% 
100,0
% 66,7% 0 0 
congested 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 14,3% 
50,0
% 0,0% 0,0% 16,7% 0 0 
terminal 
50,0
% 50,0% 
66,7
% 50,0% 0,0% 25,0% 0,0% 16,7% 0 0 
shipyards,drydock
s 
16,7
% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0 0 
  6 2 6 14 8 4 2 6 0 0 
 
 
Table 4.49. Operating condition. Unknown cases excluded). Focus on ship’s size and basic 
hull type. 
  
Panam
ax 
  
Afram
ax 
  
Suezm
ax 
  
VLCC 
  
ULC
C 
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Table 4.50. Loading condition. Unknown cases excluded. Focus on ship’s size and basic hull 
type.  
  Panamax   Aframax Suezmax VLCC   ULCC 
  DH nonDH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH 
loaded 100,0% 100,0% 75,0% 85,7% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 0 0 
unloaded 0,0% 0,0% 25,0% 14,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0 0 
total  2 2 4 7 1 2 1 4 0 0 
 
Table 4.51. Weather. Focus on ship’s size and basic hull type. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC   ULCC 
  DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH 
bad  16,7% 25,0% 16,7% 14,3% 37,5% 33,3% 100,0% 57,1% 0 100,0% 
no data 83,3% 75,0% 83,3% 85,7% 62,5% 66,7% 0,0% 42,9% 0 0,0% 
total 6 4 6 21 8 6 2 7 0 1 
 
 
4.4.2. Outcome of event 
Table 4.52. Percentage of NASF accidents, that led to LOWI. Focus on ship’s size and basic 
hull type. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC   ULCC 
 LOWI DH nonDH DH nonDH DH nonDH DH 
nonD
H 
D
H nonDH 
Yes 
66,7
% 
100,0
% 0,0% 61,9% 
25,0
% 83,3% 
50,0
% 71,4% 0 0,0% 
No 
33,3
% 0,0% 
100,0
% 38,1% 
75,0
% 16,7% 
50,0
% 28,6% 0 
100,0
% 
  DH 
nonD
H DH 
nonD
H DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH DH 
nonD
H 
Berth 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0 0 
Sailing / En-route 33,3% 
50,0
% 20,0% 
58,3
% 100,0% 
100,0
% 
100,0
% 
100,0
% 0 0 
Discharging 0,0% 0,0% 40,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0 0 
Port 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 8,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0 0 
Anch./Moor./Mano
euv. 66,7% 0,0% 0,0% 
16,6
% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0 0 
Loading 0,0% 
50,0
% 20,0% 
16,7
% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0 0 
Ballasting 0,0% 0,0% 20,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0 0 
Bunkering 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0 0 
Total 6 2 5 12 6 3 2 6 0 0 
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Total 6 4 6 21 8 6 2 7 0 1 
Average age of 
LOWI 4 15,8 - 15,5 4 11,5 4 9,6 - 14 
 
As already discussed, non DH ships seem to be more vulnerable to LOWI than DH, something 
possibly attributed to greater age. 
The small average age of DH Panamax, Suezmax and VLCC, that suffered LOWI, is an 
indicator of  deficient structures .Furthermore, it is remarkable, that not even a single DH 
Aframax suffered LOWI. 
Some information regarding DH large tankers that suffered LOWI: 
 DH Panamax:4 different ships, built 2002-2006, 2 in South Korea, 1 in China, 1 in 
Croatia 
 DH  Suezmax:1 ship, that had LOWI 2 times in the same year, built in South Korea 
 DH VLCC: built in Japan in 2002 
  
Table 4.53. Percentage of NASF, in which the ship broke in pieces. Focus on ship’s size and 
basic hull type. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC   ULCC 
 
DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH 
yes  0% 25% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% - 0% 
no 100% 75% 100% 91% 100% 100% 100% 100%   100% 
 
3 cases, in which a large tanker with known hull type broke in pieces- 1 non DH Panamax and 
2 nonDH Aframax   
Table 4.54. Various outcomes. Focus on ship’ size and basic hull type. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax 
  DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH 
towed away 16,7% 25,0% 0,0% 4,8% 12,5% 0,0% 
sailed by her means 66,7% 75,0% 100,0% 90,5% 87,5% 83,3% 
remains afloat 100,0% 75,0% 100,0% 90,5% 100,0% 100,0% 
sold for demolition 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
broken up 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 4,8% 0,0% 0,0% 
ship other transfer 0,0% 0,0% 16,7% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
ship internal transfer 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 4,8% 0,0% 0,0% 
total cases 6 4 6 21 8 6 
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  VLCC   ULCC   
  DH Non DH DH Non DH 
towed away 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
sailed by her means 100,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0% 
remains afloat 100,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0% 
sold for demolition 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
broken up 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
ship other transfer 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
ship internal transfer 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
total cases 2 7 0 1 
 
Table 4.55. Distribution of NASF by degree of severity. Focus on basic hull type and ship’s 
size. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC   ULCC 
  DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH 
serious 66,7% 50,0% 83,3% 23,8% 12,5% 16,7% 100,0% 57,1%  - 0,0% 
non serious 33,3% 50,0% 16,7% 61,9% 87,5% 66,7% 0,0% 42,9%  - 100,0% 
Unknown 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 14,3% 0,0% 16,7% 0,0% 0,0%  - 0,0% 
total 6 4 6 21 8 6 2 7 0 1 
 
Table 4.56. Distribution of serious NASF by severity level. Focus on basic hull type and ship’s 
size. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC   ULCC 
serious cases DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH DH Non DH DH 
non
DH 
serious  
100,0
% 50,0% 
100,0
% 
100,0
% 100,0% 
100,0
% 
100,0
% 100,0% - - 
total loss 0,0% 50,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% - - 
Total serious 
cases 4 2 5 5 1 1 2 4 0 0 
 
 
Table 4.57. Nature of NASF. Ship’s part damaged. Focus on ship’s size and basic hull type. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC   ULCC   
  DH nonDH DH 
Non 
DH DH nonDH DH nonDH DH nonDH 
Deck damage 0% 0% 20% 18% 43% 0% 0% 0% - - 
Hull damage 100% 75% 0% 59% 0% 100% 100% 100% - - 
Internal 0% 25% 80% 24% 57% 0% 0% 0% - - 
total(unknown 
excluded) 3 4 5 17 7 4 1 5 0 0 
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DH: Panamax and VLCC present mostly hull damage, whereas Aframax and Suezmax mostly 
internal and deck damage and not at all hull damage. The sample for Aframax and Suezmax 
is bigger and thus more trustworthy, if general conclusions should be drawn. 
Non DH: All ship types present mostly hull damage. 
 
4.4.3. Fatalities, injuries 
There were two fatalities in total, which  resulted from NASF. It could be considered as an 
occupational accident. The accident happened on a 24 year old Panamax tanker. Her hull 
type is not known. 
 
4.4.4. Oil spill information 
As far as DH large tankers are concerned, there is only one case of environmental pollution 
causes by NASF. In particular, it is a Aframax tanker with (assumed) 1t of spilled oil. 
Therefore mostly non DH tankers will be examined here. 
Table 4.58. NASF, that led to environmental pollution and tones of spilled oil. Focus on basic 
hull type. 
 cases Oil spilled(t) 
DH 1 1 
Non DH 16 149371 
Unknown hull type 22 24668 
total 39 174039 
 
 
Figure 4.56. Origin of pollution among the ship for non DH tankers. Focus on ship’s size. 
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Figure 4.57. Percentage of NASF, that led to environmental pollution. Non DH tankers. Focus 
on ship’s size. 
 
 
Figure 4.58. Distribution of total environmental pollution (as percentage of tonnes of spilled 
oil) by ship’s size. 
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Figure 4.59. Annual environmental pollution caused by non DH tankers. Yearly spill tonne 
rate. Focus on ship’s size. 
 
4.4.5.  Shipyards, flags, classes 
Table 4.59. Class when accident occurred. Focus on ship’s size and basic hull type. 
 
Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
  DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH 
American Bureau of 
Shipping 4   1 1 3 1 1 1     
Bureau Veritas             1       
Det Norske Veritas 1   2   1           
Lloyds Register 1         1   1     
Hellenic Register of 
Shipping   1                 
 
 
Table 4.60. Class when ship was built. Focus on ship’s size and basic hull type.  
 
Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
  DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH DH 
Non 
DH 
American Bureau of 
Shipping 2       1   1       
Det Norske Veritas 1   1               
Lloyds Register 1             1     
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
to
n
n
e
s 
Annual environmental pollution-(DH 
ships,ship's size)  
nonDH Panamax nonDH Aframax nonDH Suezmax nonDH VLCC
88 
 
Evangelos Farmakis                                NTUA-Ship Design Labotarory                             September 2014 
 
 
The sample in the tables above is very small and thus no logical conclusions can be drawn. 
 
Figure 4.60. Shipyard (country) of built for tankers, that presented NASF. Focus on ship’s size 
and hull type. 
 
Table 4.61. Shipyard (country) of built for tankers, that presented NASF. Focus on ship’s size 
and hull type. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC ULCC 
shipyard  built DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH 
China 3   1               
Croatia 1                   
Denmark     1               
Sweden           2       1 
Japan   4   9   1 1       
Korea (South) 2   3 6 5 1 1 5     
United States of America       5 2 1   1     
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Spain         1 1         
Canada                     
Belgium                     
Poland     1 1             
Finland                     
Netherlands                     
France                     
Italy                     
Norway                     
United Kingdom               1     
Total 6 4 6 21 8 6 2 7 0 1 
 
Table 4.62.a. Information about shipyards (countries), where DH PANAMAX, that presented 
NASF, were built. 
 
        ship's part damaged average age 
  cases serious 
broken 
in 
pieces LOWI hull deck internal 
(when NASF 
occurred) 
Korea 
(South) 2 50% 0% 100% 50% 0%   6 
China 3 66,70% 0% 33,30% 33,30% 0% 0% 4 
Croatia 1 100% 0% 100% 100% 0% 0% 3 
TOTAL 6 66,70% 0% 66,70% 50% 0% 0% 4,5 
 
Table 4.62.b. Information about shipyards (countries), where Non DH PANAMAX, that 
presented NASF, were built. 
 
    ship's part damaged average age 
  cases serious broken in pieces LOWI hull deck internal (when NASF occurred) 
Japan 4 50% 25% 100% 75%  0% 25% 15,8 
TOTAL 4 50% 25% 100% 75% 0% 25% 15,8 
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Table 4.62.c. Information about shipyards (countries), where DH AFRAMAX, that presented 
NASF, were built. 
 
        ship's part damaged average age 
  cases serious 
broken in 
pieces LOWI hull deck internal 
(when NASF 
occurred) 
Korea 
(South) 3 100% 0% 0% 0% 33% 67% 1,7 
China 1 0,00% 0% 
0,00
% 
0,00
% 0% 0% 1 
Denmark 1 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 16 
Poland 1 100,00% 0% 
0,00
% 0% 0% 100% 15 
Total 6 83,30% 0% 0 0% 17% 67% 6,2 
 
Table 4.62.d. Information about shipyards (countries), where Non DH AFRAMAX, that 
presented NASF, were built. 
 
      ship's part damaged average age 
  cases serious 
broken in 
pieces LOWI hull deck internal 
(when NASF 
occurred) 
Japan 9 22% 11% 67% 56% 11% 0% 13,1 
Korea(South
) 6 33,30% 17% 50,00% 
33,30
% 0% 50% 12,8 
U.S.A. 5 20% 0% 60% 60% 40% 0% 21,6 
Poland 1 0,00% 0% 
100,00
% 0% 0% 100% 5 
Total 21 23,8% 10% 61,90% 48% 14% 19% 14,7 
 
Table 4.62.e. Information about shipyards (countries), where DH SUEZMAX, that presented 
NASF, were built. 
 
        ship's part damaged average age 
  cases serious broken in pieces LOWI hull deck internal (when NASF occurred) 
Korea(South) 5 0% 0% 40% 0% 40% 40% 3,2 
U.S.A. 2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 16 
Spain 1 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 7 
Total 8 13% 0% 25% 0% 38% 50% 6,9 
 
Table 4.62.f. Information about shipyards (countries), where Non DH SUEZMAX, that 
presented NASF, were built. 
 
      ship's part damaged average age 
  cases serious broken in pieces LOWI hull deck internal (when NASF occurred) 
Japan 1 0% 0% 100% 100% 0% 0% 16 
Korea(South) 1 0% 0% 100% 100% 0% 0% 14 
Spain 1 0% 0% 100% 100% 0% 0% 7 
Sweden 2 50% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 18,5 
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U.S.A. 1 0% 0% 100% 100% 0% 0% 15 
Total 6 17% 0% 83% 67% 0% 0% 14,8 
 
Table 4.62.g. Information about shipyards (countries), where DH VLCC, that presented NASF, 
were built. 
 
        ship's part damaged average age 
  cases serious broken in pieces LOWI hull deck internal (when NASF occurred) 
Japan 1 100% 0% 100% 100% 0% 0% 4 
Korea(South) 1 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13 
Total 2 100% 0% 50% 50% 0% 0% 8,5 
 
Table.4.62.h. Information about shipyards (countries), where Non DH VLCC, that presented 
NASF, were built. 
 
  
 
    ship's part damaged average age 
  cases serious 
broken in 
pieces LOWI hull deck internal 
(when NASF 
occurred) 
Korea(South) 5 60% 0% 80% 80% 0% 0% 7,4 
United 
Kingdom 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 16 
U.S.A. 1 100% 0% 100% 
100
% 0% 0% 13 
total 7 57% 0% 71% 71% 0% 0% 9,4 
 
Table 4.62.i. Information about shipyards (countries), where DH ULCC, that presented NASF, 
were built. 
 
        ship's part damaged average age 
  cases serious 
broken in 
pieces LOWI hull deck internal 
(when NASF 
occurred) 
TOTAL 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 0% 0 
 
Table 4.62.j. Information about shipyards (countries), where Non  DH ULCC, that presented 
NASF, were built. 
 
      ship's part damaged average age 
  cases serious 
broken in 
pieces LOWI hull deck internal 
(when NASF 
occurred) 
Sweden 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 14 
TOTAL 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 0% 14 
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Conclusions: 
 Except for Suezmax, in all other cases DH NASF are characterized as serious in 
greater percentage compared to non DH NASF, something interesting if combined 
with the fact, that only non DH large tankers broke in pieces. Possible explanation is 
something already mentioned, in particular that accidents tend to be characterized 
as serious easier, as years go by.  
 The greater average age, at which NASF for non DH tankers occurred, could be partly 
explained by the fact that non DH fleet is older. Nevertheless, the fact that some DH 
large tankers presented NASF at really small age, is an indicator of manufacturing 
mistakes among others. DH Panamax suffer NASF at the smallest average age. 
 Non DH large tankers present mostly hull damage. As far as DH tankers are 
concerned, the picture is not that clear. DH Aframax and DH Suezmax present 
mostly internal damage, whereas DH Panamax, DH VLCC (only 2 cases though!) 
present mostly hull damage. 
 Non DH designs present more often LOWI than DH designs for all ship’s sizes. 
 DH Aframax are the only ones, that did not present LOWI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.63. Flag when ship was built. Focus on ship’s size and hull type. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC   ULCC 
 Flag DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH 
Bahamas     2               
Bermuda 1                   
Cyprus 1                   
Greece 1                 1 
India         1           
Italy                     
Liberia 2   1   4 1 1 2     
Marshall Islands     1               
Norway         1           
Norway(NIS)     1 2             
Panama   1   2   1 1       
Qatar       1             
Singapore 1     1             
Sweden                     
U.S.A         2           
USSR                     
Venezuela   1                 
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TOTAL cases 6 2 5 6 8 2 2 2 0 1 
top 11 FOC? 67% 50% 80% 33% 50% 100% 100% 100% - 0% 
 
Table 4.64. Flag when NASF occurred. Focus on ship’s size and hull type. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC   ULCC 
 Flag DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH DH Non DH 
Panama       7 2 2   2     
Australia       3             
Bahamas     1 1             
Bermuda 1                   
Bermuda(British) 1                   
Cyprus       2             
France(FIS)             1       
Greece 1     3           1 
Liberia   2   1 4 1 1 1     
Malta   1       1         
Marshall Islands 2   1               
Mauritius                     
India         1           
Iran                     
Iraq                     
Kuwait             0 1     
Gibraltar                     
Isle Of Man                     
Libya           1         
Malaysia       1             
Norway(NIS)     2 1             
Norway         1 1         
Philippines                     
Portugal(MAR)                     
Qatar       1             
Singapore 1   1         2     
Sweden               1     
TAAF     1               
Tuvalu                     
U.S.A.                     
Venezuela   1                 
TOTAL cases 6 4 6 20 8 6 2 7 0 1 
top 11 FOC*? 50% 75% 33% 55% 75% 67% 100% 43% - 0% 
*TOP 11 Flags Of Convenience: Panama, Malta, St. Vincent, Liberia, Cyprus, France(FIS), 
Marshall Islands, Antigua, Cayman Islands, Bahamas, Bermuda. 
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4.4.6 Frequencies 
 
Figure 4.61.a. NASF frequency per shipyear for PANAMAX tankers. Focus on basic hull type. 
 
Figure 4.61.b. NASF frequency per shipyear for AFRAMAX tankers. Focus on basic hull type.   
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Figure 4.61.c. NASF frequency per shipyear for SUEZMAX tankers. Focus on basic hull type. 
 
 
Figure 4.61.d. NASF frequency per shipyear for VLCC tankers. Focus on basic hull type. 
In the 4 charts  above it one should observe the trends rather than the absolute value, as the 
sample is  small. 
Table 4.65. NASF frequency per shipyear. Focus on ship’s size and basic hull type. 
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Figure 4.62.a. Frequency per shipyear of NASF, that led to environmental pollution for 
studied period. Non DH tankers.  
Non DH Aframax present the highest frequency of pollution due to NASF. 
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Figure 4.62.b. Frequency per shipyear of NASF, that led to environmental pollution. Non DH 
tankers. Focus on ship’s size 
 
Table 4.66. Annual number and frequency of NASF, that led to environmental pollution. Non 
DH tankers. Focus on ship’s size. 
  Panamax Aframax Suezmax VLCC   ULCC   
year cases frequency cases frequency cases frequency cases frequency cases frequency 
1990 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
1991 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
1992 1 5,95E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
1993 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
1994 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
1995 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
1996 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
1997 0 0,00E+00 1 3,21E-03 0 0,00E+00 1 2,92E-03 0 0 
1998 0 0,00E+00 1 3,29E-03 1 5,78E-03 1 3,01E-03 0 0 
1999 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
2000 0 0,00E+00 1 3,79E-03 1 7,73E-03 2 7,42E-03 0 0 
2001 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
2002 0 0,00E+00 2 8,69E-03 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
2003 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 1 5,62E-03 0 0 
2004 0 0,00E+00 2 1,20E-02 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
2005 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
2006 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
2007 1 1,48E-02 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
2008 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
2009 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
2010 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
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2011 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0,00E+00 0 0 
TOTAL 2 7,88E-04 7 1,38E-03 2 7,31E-04 5 9,16E-04 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Large tankers built after 1981 
This chapter is in fact a subchapter, that could be included in the chapters above. As far as 
fleet at risk by age  is concerned, there is data available only for large tankers built after 
1981. The thesis in general concerns large tankers regardless of date of built. Therefore and 
in order to avoid misconceptions, some extra data is provided for large tankers built after 
1981 in this separate chapter. Fleet at risk by age, as mentioned in chapter 3 was provided 
by Germanischer Lloyd. 
The examined sample in this case includes 41 cases in total. None of them is an ULCC. 
 
Figure 4.63. NASF frequency per shipyear by age for large tankers, that were built after 
1981. 
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Figure 4.64. NASF frequency per shipyear by age for large tankers, that were built after 
1981. Focus on basic hull type. 
Table 4.67. Frequency and number of NASF for studied period. Focus on basic hull type. 
 cases frequency 
Double Hull 20 1x10-3 
non Double Hull 21 2,48x10-3 
According to the diagram above, non double hull large tankers are more likely about to 
suffer NASF and at a younger age (as far as frequencies are concerned). 
 
Figure 4.65. NASF frequency per shipyear by age for large tankers, that were built after 
1981. Focus on ship’ size. 
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Table 4.68. Frequency and number of NASF for studied period for large tankers, that were 
built after 1981. Focus on ship’s size. 
 cases frequency 
Panamax 7 1,48x10-3 
Aframax 18 1,69x10-3 
Suezmax 8 1,62x10-3 
VLCC 8 1,13x10-3 
ULCC 0 0 
 
There is no clear tendency to comment on, when studying the above diagram. Aframax 
seem to present the most “peaks”, but no clear conclusion could be drawn. 
The overall frequencies do not present great differences.  
 
Figure 4.66.a. NASF frequency per shipyear by age for PANAMAX, that were built after 1981. 
Focus on basic hull type. 
Table 4.69.a. Frequency per shipyear and number of NASF for studied period. PANAMAX 
tankers built after 1981. Focus on basic hull type. 
 cases Frequency  
Double Hull Panamax 6 1,91x10-3 
Non Double Hull Panamax 1 6,26x10-4 
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Figure 4.66.b. NASF frequency per shipyear by age for AFRAMAX, that were built after 1981. 
Focus on basic hull type. 
Table 4.69.b. Frequency per shipyear and number of NASF for studied period. AFRAMAX 
tankers built after 1981. Focus on basic hull type. 
 cases Frequency 
Double Hull Aframax 6 7,3x10-4 
Non Double Hull Aframax 12 4,92x10-3 
 
Non Double Hull Aframax tankers are the ones that present the highest NASF frequency 
compared to the other ship’s sizes and hull types. 6 were built in South Korea and 5 in Japan 
between 1985 and 1992. 
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Figure 4.66.c. NASF frequency per shipyear by age for SUEZMAX, that were built after 1981. 
Focus on basic hull type. 
Table 4.69.c. Frequency per shipyear and number of NASF for studied period. SUEZMAX 
tankers built after 1981. Focus on basic hull type. 
 cases frequency 
Double Hull Suezmax 6 1,52x10-3 
Non Double Hull Suezmax 2 1,97x10-3 
 
 
 
Figure 4.66.d. NASF frequency per shipyear by age for VLCC, that were built after 1981. 
Focus on basic hull type. 
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Table 4.69.d. Frequency per shipyear  and number of NASF for studied period. VLCC tankers 
built after 1981. Focus on basic hull type. 
 cases frequency 
Double Hull VLCC 2 4,41x10-4 
Non Double Hull VLCC 6 2,38x10-3 
 
When hull type and ship’s size are used as parameters, the sample becomes very small. 
Therefore one should be really careful, when trying to draw conclusion in such cases. 
No ULCC built after 1981 presented NASF. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6 NASF fault tree 
In order to analyze the causes of NASF, NTUA-SDL database uses 3 categories for the origin 
of NASF: excessive loading, structural degradation, poor design/construction. My goal was to 
further develop this idea. The target of this NASF fault tree is to emphasize on the 
aggravating factors  that could lead to a Non Accidental Structural Failure.  In order to 
develop it, I studied apart from NTUA-SDL database also: 
 DNV-GL documents  
 Analytical reports of NASF accidents 
 Papers-publications on NASF 
Very useful was also the contribution of inspectors of GL and of Dr. Rainer Hamann, who was 
my tutor during my internship at DNV-GL. 
 
 
Figure 4.67. NASF fault tree 
Explanations-under discussion with respect to NASF fault tree 
-Knowledge gap/regulations: 1) The scientific effort has not covered in total and effectively a 
knowledge field/ area.2) The scientific knowledge has covered a knowledge field, but that 
knowledge was misinterpreted/misused (false regulations). In category “structural failure 
due to excessive loading –design-knowledge gap” are also cases like this one included: (for 
example)A ship designed for weather conditions in Mediterranean sea encounters a bigger 
wave(worse weather) ,than that, it was designed for and suffers a NASF. 
-welding defect: as far as shipbuilding industry is concerned, welding is the most commonly 
used way to join materials.   
-no voyage planning mistakes: ship was operated in a right way, but was not possible to deal 
in a better way with weather and failure occurred. 
-It is obvious, that further analysis is possible in order to identify other possible causes. For 
example, possible causes for voyage planning mistakes are inappropriate equipment and 
human error. It is open to discussion, how “far” behind it is meaningful to go, as far as 
causes are concerned. 
-NASFexcessive loadingstructural/manufacturing and design: although in a way 
operated, that complies with builders instructions, excessive loading problems occurred.  
-“inspection” :  is used as term in order to imply not only the inspections that are carried out 
by inspectors and surveyors, but also to imply inspection (monitoring) as carried out by crew 
, while the ship is en route for example. (for example:  corrosion in engine room bilge wells, 
having as cause, that waste water was not removed from the bilges, after the exhaust gas 
boiler had been cleaned using water). Open to discussion, if it should be distinguished 
between “inspections and surveys” and “monitoring in general (including for instance 
monitoring while the ship is en route and when there are no inspectors to perform an 
inspection, but crew should “inspect” ) 
The most important parts of such a model are two: 1) whether it succeeds in providing 
meaningful information for the studied  subject in a few words, 2) its appliance . As far as 
NTUA SDL database is concerned, the accidents’ reports are in most cases not detailed, thus 
we could not go even till the first subcauses in a lot of cases.  
Beneath are typical examples of reports of accidents in the database and indications on the 
way, that the fault tree could be applied: 
Table 4.70. Most typical examples-descriptions 
Database text Causes (faults) 
Damage/fracture/crack/hole in 
tank/plating/bottom/deck/internal structure/bulkhead 
1 
Damage/fracture/crack/hole in 
tank/plating/bottom/deck/internal structure/bulkhead 
during heavy weather 
1,262730 
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Damage/fracture/crack/hole in 
tank/plating/bottom/deck/internal structure/bulkhead 
during lightering/loading/unloading 
1,26273136 
Oil leakage None, because of 
inadequate information 
 
Table 4.71. Other examples-descriptions 
Database text Categories-causes 
Crack in weld of a tank 13819 
Cracked weld in ballast tank while loading 13819,26273136 
Hull holed because of corrosion 12 
Structural damage because of overpressurisation of a 
tank 
 
 
 
Unfortunately there are a lot of causes-faults not mentioned at all. That happens for two 
reasons: 
1. Because of lack of details.  
2. Because it would be anyway difficult to attribute a NASF to some causes. For 
instance manufacturing, design and inspection causes could not get easily 
discovered. Who could find out and report also, whether the inspection was not 
carried out properly?  
 
Other comments: 
 Structural degradation is assumed in almost all cases. It does not seem logical, that a 
ship presents a structural failure unless it was somehow corroded and got 
influenced by fatigue. There are underlying factors, such as manufacturing errors, 
something that seems to be the case in young tankers, that suffered a NASF, but one 
could only assume it, if such piece of information is not included in the accident’s 
report. 
 Other causes could be assumed in a lot of cases, but the aim was to concentrate on 
the not questionable information. 
 According to inspectors, I discussed the matter of NASF with, it is not sure, whether 
the inspectors will write down detailed or completely honestly the reasons, why an 
accident occurred. That has to do mainly with insurance and compensation 
matters… 
 
Furthermore, it would be  interesting to see how the fault tree could be used, when studying 
an accident,  for which we possess also analytical reports. That is the case for the well-
known accident of tanker “PRESTIGE” (see chapter 4.7.2 for more details on the subject). For 
this accident the causes are: 
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1. 13615. Some constructional details of PRESTIGE did not meet the 
requirements of ABS for fatigue strength of new ships (note: it was not obligatory to 
meet the requirements for younger ships). It is worth noting that the methodology 
for fatigue strength of new ships (S-N curves  developed by United Kingdom 
Department of Energy) had not yet been incorporated in the regulations of 
classification societies, when PRESTIGE was built . 
2. 12 This is a common problem for tankers, specially for older ones. 18 months had 
passed since the last special survey, during which some parts of steel of a starboard 
wing tank were found corroded beyond acceptable levels and were replaced. The 
degree of corrosion, that occurred meanwhile, does not seem enough to cause 
tank’s structural failure, also taking into consideration the existing circumstances    
3. 12,13820.The welding of new and old (and corroded) steel could create 
points of stress concentration at the interface between them and accelerate the 
corrosion rate of the old and uncoated steel. As far as the examined tank is 
concerned, great parts of steel were replaced during the special surveys of 1996 and 
2001. 
4. possibly 125 and 137. IACS surveyors investigated the accident and 
expressed doubts about certain inspection procedures and practices followed then 
by ABS . 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7 Characteristic NASF events 
 
4.7.1 Accident of “KATINA P” 
Non DH tankership  Katina P (DWT of about 70000t, built 1966 in Japan) sank on 26/4/1992 
causing an environmental pollution of about 70000t  heavy fuel oil. 
Narrative 
Before 16/4/1992- The ship departs from  Rio de Janeiro and heads through the Atlantic 
Ocean to Bangladesh in order to be scrapped. While en route, the ship was called back in 
order to pick up fuel oil (#6 heavy fuel oil)4  from Venezuela and deliver it to Fujirah in 
U.A.E.(United Arab Emirates). 
                                                          
4
 #6 heavy fuel oil is a residual oil with great viscosity and demands  preheating at 104-127 grad 
Celsius. 
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16/4/1992- Tanker  «ΚΑΤΙΝΑ Ρ» is transferring  almost 70000 tDWT (#6 heavy fuel oil)  from 
Venezuela to the Persian gulf. She encounters heavy sea, while en route. As a result she 
sustains a crack in the starboard side amidships. In particular, the crack is developed  in the 
shell plating of two cargo tanks and almost 4000t of fuel oil flow out.    
17/4/1992-19/4/1992- The crew  grounds intentionally the vessel on a sandbar six miles 
offshore of Maputo Bay. The goal is to prevent the ship from sinking. The ship is being 
anchored and abandoned by the crew members. While the ship is aground, fuel oil keeps on 
flowing out from its tanks. Meanwhile a Protection and Indemnity club representative 
embarks on the ship and inspects it. His estimation is that the ship is about to break up. 
21/4/1992- Following a request for assistance from the Mozambique Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, a US Coast Guard response team arrives on site in the evening and inspects the ship, 
while being on a helicopter. Katina P presents a heel of  7 degrees at her starboard side , the 
deck edge is located 1m under the sea level. Meanwhile fuel oil flows from its port fore part 
and  oil spills surround the ship.   
22/4/1992- In an attempt to prevent further environmental damage by the stranded tanker 
Katina P in the Maputo Bay, the crew embarks again on board. The ship is towed  by the tow 
boat «John Ross» and  heads to Mozambique Channel. The goal is to perform a ship to ship 
transfer of the cargo. 
26/4/1992- While the towing procedure is going on for the fourth consecutive day, the ship 
buckles amidships,  breaks in two pieces and sinks having the rest of the cargo in her tanks. 
The existence of an oil spill is reported, which covers a surface of 3 square sea miles. 
 
 Initiating event 
The ship was caught in gigantic waves. That resulted in failure of the shell plating in the 
ship’s starboard side. Almost 350 sq. m. of plating were cut off from Νο2 ballast tank and 
Νο3 Cargo tank. In addition to this, a part of weather deck collapsed. 
 
Information about the sinking of the ship 
-The ship broke at a point of the hull, which is precisely stern of the manifold and where the 
midship segregated ballast tanks are located. 
- Ship’s location was 173km (93sm) off Mozambique’s coast , 440 km (237sm)northeastern of 
Maputo. The depth in the region was almost 2000m. 
-Weather conditions were good.     
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Causes-aggravating factors 
There are no detailed reports available, in order to accurately determine the causes. Initially 
a great part of the shell plating of two tanks failed, most likely during ship’s sagging and at a 
point located near midship. Possible causes and aggravating factors for this Non Accidental 
Structural (NASF) are: 
-Corrosion: The ship was 26 years old by the time the accident occurred.  That means that 
corrosion could have influenced the structure largely. This factor could be examined further, 
if the reports of the latest surveys and inspections of the tanks, that took place, were 
available.  
-Fatigue: the methodology for fatigue strength for new ships (S-N curves, developed by 
United Kingdom Department of Energy) was not integrated in the classification societies’ 
regulations, when Κatina P was built. 
-Adverse weather conditions: the accident’s report makes it clear, that the first failure 
(initiating event) took place, while the vessel was travelling in very bad weather conditions. 
-Bad condition of the structure: that is a general, but meaningful observation, if we take into 
consideration that the ship was initially en route to Bangladesh  in order to be scrapped.  
-Failure to locate all possible weaknesses-deficiencies during surveys and inspections.  
- For a ship that old it could be easily guessed that from time to time deficient parts of 
plating have been replaced with new ones. However, that could lead to the creation of 
stress concentration zones in the interface between the old and the new metal, something 
that accelerates corrosion. 
  
  
Table 4.72. Main particulars-further information  
Built by Hitachi Shipbuilding Mukaishima-  Onomichi, 
Japan 
Year built 1966 
Final flag Malta 
Class Hellenic Register (Greek) 
Length overall 238 m 
Breadth 36,45 m 
Depth 16,36 m 
Hull type (pre MARPOL) single hull 
Cargo heavy fuel oil 
Gross tonnage 30890 tons 
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Consequences-compensation-coping  with the spill 
Pollution caused by the accident of KATINA P had major socioeconomic consequences for 
Mozambique. The territory that was polluted was of great significance, as far as flora and 
fauna are concerned. Furthermore, fish are a major part of Mozambicans’ diet and a lot of 
them are fishermen. Therefore, there was obviously an impact on their life, at least for 
fishermen’s families and for the period of time, during which fishing was prohibited, as they 
were deprived of their means of livelihood. 
The sum of money, that Mozambique received as compensation for the environmental 
pollution, was pretty small (4,5 mil.$). The lack of expertise and contingency plans and the 
fact that Mozambique had not signed the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
conventions, enabling compensation in the event of a spill, justified this low level of 
compensation (see table beneath for an estimation of the maximum sum of money 
Mozambique could receive as compensation for the oil spill). 
 
There were delays and problems concerning the oil spill response. This is attributed to the 
civil war at that time in Mozambique and to the lack of resources and expertise. 
Taking into consideration the type of the fuel oil(#6 heavy fuel oil) that was transferred, the 
most likely scenario is: fuel oil solidified at water temperature  (3 grad Celsius at the sea 
bottom at the territory, where the ship sank) and remained there for several months. 
Subsequently and taking the strong currents of that area into consideration, fuel oil-at least 
a part of it- was swept away southern of Mozambique.  
 
 
 
Suspicious activities 
-The decision, that a ship to ship transfer of the cargo should take place far away from the 
grounding place, although a Protection and Indemnity club representative inspected the ship 
and clarified that the ship was about to break in two parts. 
-It is not obvious, why somebody should prefer to import fuel oil from Venezuela to the 
Persian Gulf. 
              -There are questions concerning: a) the location, where the ship was stranded and why it 
was preferred, b) the route that KATINA P followed, while it was towed away. There are 
suspicions that the ship’s owner was attempting to cover up traces of unlawful activity.  
 
Lessons to be learnt 
-The combination of flag of Malta and Greek classification society does not seem to be 
trustworthy. 
111 
 
Evangelos Farmakis                                NTUA-Ship Design Labotarory                             September 2014 
 
 -It is clear , that if there were available databases concerning the sea currents in the area 
and trained personnel, it would be possible to do simulation studies to predict the pathways 
of the oil spill, and to design ways and means of containing and eliminating it with 
international assistance.  
-The ship was en route to be scrapped and obviously not in the best condition. Despite that, 
it was fully loaded and travelled in the open sea, a combination that led to structural 
overstressing.  
 
Table 4.73. Maximum amounts of compensation available under the IMO conventions 
(expressed in US$ millions- rates as at September 2013) 
TANKER’S 
GROSS 
TONNAGE 
1969 CLC 1992 CLC(post-
Nov 2003) 
1992 FUND 
(post Nov-2003) 
Supplementary FUND  
5000 1 6,6 299,7 1107  
25000 4,9 25,3 299,7 1107  
50000 9,82 48,6 299,7 1107  
100000 19,64 95,2 299,7 1107  
140000 20,7 132,4 299,7 1107  
 
CLC: International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
FUND convention: International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund 
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 
  
Additional witness 
Below is the testimony of Wayne Stephen, second engineer of « John Ross», the tow boat 
that was towing KATINA P, when the latter sank.  
“I was guided to your site by your book The Tankship Tromedy. I particularly viewed your 
data on the Katina P, as I was the Second Engineer on board the John Ross, the salvage tug 
that took Katina P in tow. I also lay claim to having taken the photographs you have 
published on your site. 
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My recollection of events is slightly different to those described in your database. 
The vessel was carrying a cargo of HFO from Brazil to Fujairah, coals to Newcastle and was 
then destined to be broken up. The initial breaking up of the vessel was noted by the ship’s 
crew as she rounded the Cape. Vessel was cracked on the starboard side through the side 
shell plating. However, the crack was aft of the cargo manifold, also a location of SBT. The 
Chief Officer of John Ross reported that most of the deck longitudinals had been detached 
from the deck. 
The vessel was not grounded off Maputo. She was anchored and abandoned by the ship’s 
crew. The Master, Chief and 2nd Engineer returned to the vessel when the salvage operation 
was commenced. This was not expected to be successful as own vessel was on a daily hire 
rate rather than a Lloyd’s Open Form contract. On our arrival at Katina P’s location, it was 
observed that the hull forward of the break was upright whilst the accommodation section 
had a pronounced starboard list. Katina P was taken in tow with the intention of meeting 
with a lightening ship to try and recover as much oil as possible. Katina P sank before the 
arrival of the lightening ship. 
                Some 40 personnel, involved in restoring power to the boilers in order to have the cargo 
pumps operational were transferred from Katina P to our vessel, and two others also in 
attendance without incident. One person delayed leaving the vessel as he attempted to 
rescue the ship’s cat, but he was unable to catch it and had to leave. 
Of interest is that the lightening ship, the name of which I do not recall, was an OBO which 
proceeded to Richard’s Bay to load a full cargo of coal. During loading the main sea water 
line ruptured at night and the engine room flooded resulting in the ship’s sinking. It is 
understood but not confirmed that the vessel and Katina P were owned by the same 
company, although naturally in one ship companies.” 
 
Interesting points of the testimony:  
-The ship was not grounded, but anchored and abandoned. 
 -The Master, Chief and 2nd Engineer returned to the vessel when the salvage operation was 
commenced. This was not expected to be successful as own vessel was on a daily hire rate 
rather than a Lloyd’s Open Form contract  
-When the tow boat arrived at the place where KATINA P was located, it was observed that 
the hull forward of the break was upright whilst the accommodation section had a 
pronounced starboard list. 
-The OBO tanker, which was about to perform the lightening, sank. Maybe the second 
engineer means  OBO “ENDEAVOR II”(96000t DWT).  
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Figure 4.68. Photo taken, when KATINA P broke in two pieces. 
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4.7.2. Accident of “PRESTIGE” 
Non DH tanker Prestige (DWT=81564t, built 1976 in Japan) sank on November 19, 2002 off 
the northwest coast of Spain, while having in its tanks nearly 77000t fuel oil.  
Narrative  
22/6/2002-30/10/2002-The ship stays in St. Petersburg, where she is used as a means of 
storage and transport. 
30/10/2002-5/11/2002-She arrives at Latvia with tanks partly filled with FOM 100 fuel oil, 
except for port and starboard after wing tank 2 and port and starboard wing tank 3. The ship 
loads extra cargo (fuel oil) and  departs for Gibraltar. 
13/11/2002- After a trip, during which no problems were reported, Prestige arrives at Traffic 
Separation Scheme off of Cape Finistere in Spain. During the afternoon of 13th of November 
the ship encounters a large wave, which results in powerful slamming of the hull. 
Subsequently the tanker presents a heel of 20 degrees on starboard side. Furthermore the 
Butterworth covers of some starboard wing tanks were displaced and fuel oil flew out, while 
sea spray was seen coming out of starboard wing tank 3, which was empty before the 
accident. Captain’s reaction is to fill 2 tanks (port after wing tank 2 , port wing tank 3) and so 
the heel is reduced to less than 5 degrees. On the same day, the whole crew except for 
master, chief officer and chief engineer, was transferred by helicopter off the ship. 
                14/11/2002- After a series of failed attempts connection was established with a tug boat by 
personnel, who came for this purpose on board. The captain asks permission to sail in place 
of refuge, a request denied by Spanish authorities, which order, that the ship should sail off 
the northwest coast. A Spanish surveyor, who has embarked on the ship, starts the main 
engine after some repairs, despite initial objections of the captain, who thought that the 
vibrations caused by the operation of the main engine, would result in overstressing of the 
hull.  
15/11/2002- The captain stops the main engine. A salvation team embarks on the ship and 
repairs some damages (closure of some Butterworth openings) out of several observed 
(deck plating over starboard wing tank 3 was buckled and the most of the shell plating above 
the water level in way of starboard wing tank 3 was missing. Starboard after wing tank 2 and 
starboard wing tank 3 were open to the sea and oil flew out). The Spanish authorities reject 
again the request - issued this time by the head of the salvation team- to head the tanker 
towards the Spanish coast in order to perform a ship to ship transfer in a safe place. Instead, 
they suggest a ship to ship transfer near the Canary Islands. The ship is towed to a northwest 
direction in an effort to find more favorable weather. At noon on November 15 a sharp 
deterioration of weather was observed (winds of about 8-9 Beaufort).  The ship is evacuated 
for the evening. In La Coruna the captain is interrogated, while indictments are issued 
against him by the Harbour Master.  
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516-11-2002-The Salvation team returns onboard. The wind remains strong (8-9 Beaufort). 
Furthermore, the deck plating in the area over starboard wing tank 3  is cut off and 
difficulties exist as far as the connection of Prestige to the towing boats is concerned.  
17-11-2002- For reasons unclear, the Spanish authorities ordered that the towing of Prestige 
should temporarily stop. A series of problems is observed: the winch on the starboard side 
presents an incline of about 20 degrees, the longitudinal bulkhead between starboard wing 
tank 3 and centre tank 3 is damaged and a large amount of oil has spilled into the sea. 
18-11-2002-In the morning connection to an extra tug boat is achieved. The ship is now 
connected to 2 tugs. In the night Portuguese authorities prohibit Prestige from entering 
Portuguese EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). 
19-1-2002- The ship bends and breaks in two pieces, which sink within a few hours. 
 
Initiating event 
               The ship was hit by a large wave, something that caused a crack in the shell plating of 
starboard wing tank 3. The combination of a large wave and an empty tank revealed all the 
potential structural weaknesses. The increase of pressure within starboard wing tank 3, 
combined with the deformation, caused by the side and deck structural collapse (of the 
same tank), led to cracking of the bulkhead. The crack appeared between starboard wing 
tank 3 and starboard after wing tank 2 and led to the flooding of the second one. The ship 
quickly  began to present heel on its starboard side. According to simulations the ship 
reached a heel of 10 degrees within two minutes (really fast!) 1.Finally the heel was 15-20 
degrees, before the captain took action in order to reduce it.  
              
               Weather conditions 
During the initial event, that led to the sinking of PRESTIGE, the significant wave height2 was 
about 6 m in the area. It is possible that PRESTIGE encountered a 10m wave from tough to 
crest with a very steep face and a high toppling crest. Before sinking the tanker encountered 
also for a short period of time waves with a significant height of almost 7m. 
 
                                                          
1 The calculations for ship’s heel are based on the scenario of the simultaneous flooding of starboard 
wing tank 3 and starboard after wing tank 2, which were the only completely empty  storage 
spaces, whose flooding could lead to such a heel. 
2 
Significant wave height in an area is the average height (from top to bottom) of one third of the 
highest waves.  
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 Aggravating factors for structural weakness 
It is not possible to determine a specific cause for the failure of the structure, which led to 
the flooding of two tanks. Factors, that possibly led to the initial failure of starboard wing 
tank3 -independently or combined-, are: 
Α) Damage due to contact with another vessel during ship to ship transfer of cargo: the ship 
served as a storage ship for over 3 months in St. Petersburg. Subsequently she was 
constantly very close to ships, which were coming in order to load or unload. It is possible, 
that damages occur to the shell plating, if relatively large ships approach and connect to the 
storage ship with great speed and/or at an improper angle. It is worth noting, that there was 
no damage reported as far as this type of accidents are concerned, during the ship’s stay in 
St. Petersburg.  
Β) Fatigue: It was found that some constructional details of PRESTIGE did not meet the 
requirements of ABS (American Bureau of Shipping) for fatigue strength of new ships (note: 
it was not obligatory to meet the requirements for younger ships). It is worth noting that the 
methodology for fatigue strength of new ships (S-N curves6 , developed by United Kingdom 
Department of Energy) had not yet been incorporated in the regulations of classification 
societies, when PRESTIGE was built . 
C) Corrosion: This is a common problem for tankers. 18 months had passed since the last 
special survey, during which some parts of steel of starboard wing tank 3 were found 
corroded beyond acceptable levels and were replaced. The degree of corrosion, that 
occurred meanwhile, does not seem enough to cause tank’s structural failure, also taking 
into consideration the existing circumstances (1. Ship’s location was mainly protected areas 
and not open sea and thus the ship was not subjected to high loads, 2.for a long period of 
time the tank was empty, thus corrosion was occurring slowly)   
D) Replacement of old steel with new one: The welding of new and old (and corroded) steel 
could create points of stress concentration at the interface between them and accelerate 
the corrosion rate of the old and uncoated steel. As far as the examined tank is concerned, 
great parts of steel were replaced during the special surveys of 1996 and 2001 (mostly 
reinforced frames, side longitudinals, bulkhead’s plating between starboard wing tank 3 and 
starboard after wing tank 2) 
Ε) Failure of the transverse bulkhead between starboard wing tank 3 and starboard after 
wing tank 2: There was no ballast or cargo in any of the two sides of the bulkhead. 2/3 of 
tank’s steel was replaced in 2001, while the measurements for the remaining 1/3 were 
within acceptable limits. We could therefore assume, that it appears unlikely, that the 
bulkhead would have been largely corroded within those 18 months between the last 
special survey and the accident. Based on the photographic evidence transverse bulkhead’s 
                                                          
6 S-N curves: curves used to calculate the number of repetitions required for fatigue failure, 
when specific stress is applied. 
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failure resulted from failure of tank’s shell plating, but the possibility, that a weakness of the 
bulkhead played a role in the cracking of the tank, could not be excluded. 
 
Surveys and inspections 
Surveys and inspections were performed in a strictly correct manner apart from some small 
exceptions. Typical examples are:   
- IACS surveyors investigated the accident and expressed doubts about certain procedures 
and practices followed then by ABS (specifically: official report/documentation on board as 
far as ESP (Enhanced Survey Procedures) are concerned, management of ballast tanks, 
management of cargo, cargo tanks’ hydrostatic test and official report of IOPP Certification) . 
-3 wing tanks were uncoated and were corroded to some degree.  If they were categorized 
under ballast tanks, they should have been inspected during the annual surveys. 
 
Ship’s management  
Ship’s management complied fully with international rules and regulations. 
Table 4.74. Main particulars- further information 
Shipyard built Hitachi shipyard, 
Osaka, Japan 
Year of build 1976 
Original flag  Panama 
Final flag Bahamas 
Class ABS 
Length overall 243,49 m 
Length bp 232,02m 
Breadth moulded 34,41m 
Depth 18,7 m 
Summer load draft 14,027m 
Service speed(as built) 15 knots 
Hull type Single hull 
Service speed(final charter) 12 knots 
Propulsion 8 cylinder diesel, 
14711 kW 
Deadweight 81564 tonnes 
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Conclusions- Suggestions 
-There was no loss of (human) life or serious injury, but French and Spanish coasts were 
seriously polluted. 
-It is not possible to determine with absolute accuracy the cause of the initial failure. 
-It is not sure, that structural weakness could be identified during surveys and inspections by 
the equipment then in use. However it is obvious, that there were sources of danger, that 
were not identified on time. 
-It must be fully clarified, who is the decision maker, when emergencies arise, as it seems 
that Spanish authorities were confused during the procedures for rescuing PRESTIGE, 
something that caused greater problems and delays. 
-A ship should not be prohibited from entering a place of refuge, if  before that  all the 
alternatives and consequences are not examined carefully. It is highly possible that the 
consequences, that result from a decision to prohibit a damaged ship from entering a place 
of refuge, are catastrophic and the example of PRESTIGE is really instructive. 
-The captain was treated unfairly (imprisonment for 80 days, etc.), something not at all 
justified by his actions and decisions. 
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Figure 4.69. Photo taken, when PRESTIGE broke in two pieces. 
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4.8 NASF conclusions 
 
Below one may find the conclusions with respect to the occurrence and the consequences of 
NASF accidents, focusing on a variety of aspects/criteria. The structure of the below given 
comments  follows this principle: section a) gives general comments, sections b), c) provide 
additional information. Section d) (focus on ship’s size and hull type) is not listed here. By 
subdividing the data in 5 ship sizes and 2 hull type categories, the analysis sample becomes 
very small for reliable conclusions.  Additionally, 58% of the NASF concern tankers with 
unknown hull types. Therefore, it becomes problematic to draw reliable conclusions, but it is 
possible to identify significant trends of developments. 
 
a) Full sample 
-No straightforward relationship between ship’s age and NASF. 44% of NASF concerns ships 
older than 15 years. This indicates an expected connection between ship’s age and structural 
problems.12% of NASF concerns young ships (till 5 years old); even more these are ships 
built in more recent years; this reveals possible manufacturing problems in more recent 
shipbuildings. 
-57% of NASF took place in open sea. Despite being built to handle a wide range of weather 
conditions, open sea is the most dangerous event location for NASF, because of greater 
developed stresses compared to more protected waters. Surprisingly, a great percentage 
took place in terminal waters, something that could be attributed to loading mistakes, like 
ship being overloaded or incorrectly loaded. 
- A loaded tanker is more likely to suffer a NASF in comparison to an unloaded tanker 
according to studied data. 
-33% of NASF are weather related.  It should be noted, that there was no reporting of good 
weather. In the rest 67% there was no weather description, maybe because it was not 
considered as an aggravating factor. Furthermore, bad weather conditions can reveal 
problems of a structure, that already presents small or big weaknesses. But weather can not 
affect a seaworthy, correctly designed, manufactured, operated ship,  that follows all the 
right inspection and monitoring procedures. 
-60% of NASF leads to Loss Of Watertight Integrity (LOWI), that consists an aggravating 
factor for ship’s seaworthiness. 
-35% of the accidents are characterized as serious. Out of the serious ones, 8%  are 
considered as total losses. A growing tension can also be noted: An accident gets more easily 
characterized as serious over time or-to rephrase it- more rarely is an accident characterized 
as non serious nowadays. 
-NASF frequency for the large tankers of the studied period is 4,124x10-3failures per 
shipyear. Over the last 23 years a clear tendency can be noted: The frequency decreases. 
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Possible factors are regulatory measures, changes in ship design and technology and overall 
improvement of the safety culture of maritime industry. 
-At 68% of the cases the damaged ship’s part was hull, 23% internal and 9% deck. One needs   
to use hull type and ship’s size as parameters in order to draw logical conclusions. 
-NASF occurred at an average age of 14,4 years. It should be noted that there are great 
deviations. Ship’s built in the 1990’s and thereafter present a very  small average age of 
NASF occurrence (5,4 years). 
-NASF do not present a great danger for life of crew. In general there were two fatalities, 
that happened during the same accident.(5,56x10-5 fatalities per shipyear). Contrariwise 
NASF pose a significant threat for the environment. Frequency is 1,1x10-3 NASF leading to 
(even the slightest)  environmental pollution per shipyear for the large tankers of the 
studied period. 174039 tonnes of oil were spilled in total. Subsequently, 3 out of 39 pollution 
related accidents are responsible for 96% of the total environmental pollution (in tones) 
caused by NASF during the studied period. There are reports available for the two of them in 
chapter 4.7. 
-shipyard(country), the tanker was built in: Some interesting data will be repeated here 
having the manufacturing country as parameter. a) South Korea: 26 NASF cases, 31% 
presented hull damage, 27% internal damage, failed at an average age of 8,5 years, built 
between 1974-2004. b) China: 4 cases, 3 built 2004-2006, failed at an average age of 3,25 
years, all DH designs, c) Japan: 48 were built in Japan, average age of 15,8 years  
Unfortunately, there was no available data as far as fleet at risk by manufacturing country is 
concerned, and thus frequencies could not be calculated. Therefore, as the above countries 
are the main tanker shipbuilding countries, the outcome is not surprising. 
-There seems to be no obvious relationship between flag, under which the ship was 
operated, and NASF. The flag states are not the ones responsible for controlling ship’s 
seaworthiness. Their role is limited mostly to crewing issues. A relationship between NASF 
and ships flying a flag of convenience appears possible, but could not be proved within the 
frame of this thesis, as we lacked sufficient data for the fleet at risk by flag of operation. 
Avoiding  strict regulations and hiring insufficiently skilled crew in some cases 
(characteristics of a flag of convenience) are negative factors for the operation of a ship, but 
their impact on NASF is not straightforward and obvious. 
-The relationship between classification societies and ship’s seaworthiness is clear, but lack 
of data makes it impossible to draw precise conclusions. 
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Figure 4.70. NASF frequency per shipyear, when the studied period is divided in 3 time 
intervals. 
b) Focusing on hull type 
-The average age of DH tankers, that suffered a NASF is only 6,2, small compared to 13,8 
average age of NASF for non DH designs. That piece of information can be misleading. In fact 
the above can be partly justified, because of the fact that DH fleet is younger than non DH 
fleet, yet it remains problematic that so young DH tankers suffered a NASF (56%of DH 
accidents concerns ships till 5 years old). By studying the frequencies, the conclusion can be 
drawn that a non DH large tanker is more likely to suffer a NASF compared to a DH one 
(2,37x10-3 NASF per shipyear for non DH and 1,16x10-3  for DH) 
- Although the sample is not big, non DH ships seem to be more vulnerable to LOWI (Loss Of 
Watertight Integrity) than DH, a prove of superiority of DH concepts, as far as facing of LOWI 
is concerned. The fact, that non DH fleet is older than DH fleet is of great importance 
though. Average age of LOWI occurrence for DH tankers is  only 4 years and for non DH ones 
14,3. For DH that means mostly poor manufacturing and for non DH inadequate 
maintenance. 
-There are no cases, in which a DH tanker broke in pieces and sank compared to 3 such cases 
for non DH tankers.(2 out of 3 concern PRESTIGE and KATINA P). 
-There is a growing trend of characterizing more easily an accident as serious over time or-to 
rephrase it- more rarely is an accident characterized as non serious, if it is reported. In the 
period 2001-2011 only two NASF have been considered as non serious.(out of 24 in total 
during the same period) 
- DH tankers present mostly internal structural problems, while non DH tankers present 
mostly hull problems. Arguments, that justify this can be found at the end of chapter  4.2.2. 
(key words: global stresses, maintenance, age, simplicity of design) 
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-There was less than 1 ton of oil spillage resulting from a DH NASF (1 case). In contrast, 16 
cases of oil spillage, resulting from a non DH NASF, caused great environmental pollution. It 
does not go unnoticed, that tankers seem to become gradually environmentally friendlier 
with the introduction of DH design, although the problem is only partly solved (for example 
DH designs reduce environmental risk for low energy collision and groundings, but not for 
high energy ones. That extends beyond the limits of this thesis and will not be discussed 
further)   
 
Figure 4.71. NASF frequency per shipyear, when the studied period is divided in 3 time 
intervals. Focus on basic hull type. 
 
c) Focusing on ship’s size 
For the younger group ages the noticeable difference is to be found in the interval 5-10 
years.28 % of Panamax NASF are to be found within these age limits, by far the  highest 
compared to the other large tanker’s sizes. Nevertheless, the overall results do not let us 
draw precise conclusions, when studied more detailed. The average ages are comparable 
between the 5 sizes. 
-ULCC present the highest NASF frequency per shipyear, something explained partly by the 
very large developed stresses, when these titans travel in open sea. 
-Open sea is more frequently the event location of a NASF, as the ship’s size gets bigger. 74% 
of VLCC and 86% of ULCC NASF took place in open sea compared to 40% for Panamax and 
Aframax. Furthermore, the larger the ship, the more dimensional limitations it faces. 
Therefore, it seems logical that no ULCC NASF took place in congested waters. Lastly, as far 
as Panamax and Aframax are concerned, the percentages for open sea and terminal waters 
as event location are similar( Panamax 40% and 33%,Aframax 41% and 47% respectively). 
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- Panamax present LOWI at 83,3%, a percentage significantly greater, than those of the 
other large tanker’s sizes, which vary between 50% and 58%.  The causes are not clear. The 
small sample possibly plays a role. 
-Environmental pollution in tones of spilled oil was caused at 99% by Panamax and 
Aframax.(Note that 3 accidents are responsible for 96% of the total environmental pollution 
in tones caused by NASF).  Panamax (ironically) and Suezmax tankers present the lowest 
environmental pollution frequencies per shipyear.   
 
Figure 4.72. NASF frequency per shipyear, when the studied period is divided in 3 time 
intervals. Focus on ship’s size. 
 
 
After studying chapter 4.5 (Large tankers built after 1981) the following interesting finding 
should be mentioned: 
-Non double hull large tankers are more likely about to suffer NASF and at a younger age (as 
far as frequencies are concerned). The first part complies with the findings for large tankers 
regardless of date of built. But the second part provides something new and extra proof, 
that maritime industry makes steps forward towards becoming safer and environmentally 
friendlier, as DH designs fail at an older age. Emphasis is put on the second part, because 
according to the previous data concerning large tankers independently of year of built, DH 
designs failed at a younger (average) age. That is true, when talking about average age of 
ships that failed, but not when taking fleet at risk by age into consideration and calculating 
frequencies. There are two reasons for this “contrast”: a)Fleet at risk by age is not available 
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for ships built before 1982. b) Ships built before 1982 are not included in this chapter. As 
already mentioned non DH fleet is older than DH fleet. So without knowing fleet at risk by 
age it is difficult to compare age of failure for these two different fleets. The following 
diagram helps explaining the above arguments in a better way.  
 
Figure 4.64. NASF frequency per shipyear by age. Tankers built after 1981. Focus on basic 
hull type. 
NOTE: Figure 4.64 is presented for the second time. It can be found in chapter 4.5. 
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5. Analysis of Machinery Failures 
 
 
 
Machinery failure events consist of scenarios where  a technical failure of machinery or a 
related system affects the vessel’s seaworthiness (note that, when machinery failure leads 
to grounding (drift grounding), it is accounted for under grounding events).  
The full sample consists of 417 cases. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Annual number of machinery failures and severity level per year. 
Studying the frequencies will let us draw more precise conclusions. At first glance, the peaks 
are to be noticed within the first time interval of the studied period. 
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Figure 5.2. Group ages of large tankers, which suffered machinery failure. 
One should focus on the fact, that 15% concern ships 5 years old or younger. That should 
mainly be attributed to manufacturing problems, rather than inspection issues, which 
become of greater importance, as the machines become older. 
 
Figure 5.3. Date of built of large tankers, which suffered machinery failure. 
The fact that most large tankers, that presented a machinery failure, were of relative old 
age(>10 years) could be possibly attributed to inadequate maintenance. 
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Figure 5.4. Distribution of machinery failures by ship’s size. 
 
Figure 5.5. Distribution of fleet at risk by ship’s size. 
Ship’s size does not seem to be an important parameter, when it comes to machinery 
failure. 
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5.1 Event location, ship operation, environment 
 
Figure 5.6. Event location. Unknown cases excluded. 
Open sea it the event location mostly represented here. That is maybe because, machinery 
systems could be tested closely to their maximum potential in the constantly changing 
conditions of the open sea.  
Unknown cases: 121/417 (29%) 
 
Figure 5.7. Operating condition. Unknown cases excluded. 
Unknown cases: 129/417 (31%) 
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Figure 5.8. Loading condition. Unknown cases excluded. 
Unknown cases: 388/417 (93%) !!! The sample in this case is relatively small and thus no safe 
conclusions could be drawn.  
 
 
Figure 5.9. Weather. 
Weather is theoretically an important parameter, because during heavy weather a machine 
could be tested to its “maximum potential”. Unfortunately lack of details does not allow us 
to draw more precise conclusions.  
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5.2 Outcome of event 
There was no tanker, that presented machinery failure, that suffered LOWI (Loss Of 
Watertight Integrity) or broke in pieces. Also in all cases the tanker remained afloat. 
 
Figure 5.10. Percentage of machinery failure cases, in which the ship was towed away after 
the accident. 
 
Figure 5.11. Percentage of machinery failure cases, in which the ship was broken up after 
the accident. 
3 cases of machinery failures led to the ship being broken up afterwards, as the ships were 
old (>23 years old) and it was considered of no financial benefit to repair them. It is not clear 
in the database, but it is also possible, that the ships were any way about to get broken up. 
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Figure 5.12. Distribution of machinery failures by degree of severity. 
260 out of 417 machinery failures took place between 1990 and 1993.  Studying also 
frequencies leads us to the conclusion, that as we go back in the studied period, accidents 
are mostly characterized as non serious. On the other hand, studying more recent accidents, 
we understand that nowadays machinery failures are mostly characterized as serious. To 
sum up, the above arguments mean that an accident that happened in early 90’s and a 
similar one, that took place in the late 00’s could be characterized as non serious and serious 
respectively, although they had similar consequences. 
 
Table 5.1. Annual number of machinery failures and degree of severity. 
year accidents serious 
non 
serious 
1990 82 7 75 
1991 77 14 63 
1992 65 8 57 
1993 36 12 24 
1994 16 2 14 
1995 20 8 12 
1996 21 10 11 
1997 19 9 10 
1998 5 2 3 
1999 9 5 4 
2000 3 2 1 
2001 4 0 1 
2002 2 0 0 
2003 2 2 0 
2004 2 2 0 
non serious 
68% 
serious 
31% 
no data 
1% degree of severity 
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2005 9 7 2 
2006 3 1 2 
2007 11 11 0 
2008 12 10 2 
2009 9 9 0 
2010 7 7 0 
2011 3 2 1 
  417 130 282 
 
 
 
5.3 Fatalities, injuries 
There are two cases, in which human life was seriously affected: 
1. A crew member was washed overboard during heavy weather (after a machinery 
failure) and was injured. 
2. A steam pipe in the engine room burst and one crew member was killed. 
The frequency per shipyear is 2 cases/35406,6 shipyears= 5,65x10-5 fatalities per shipyear. 
The frequency it to be neglected compared to frequencies of other categories of tanker’s 
failures. 
 
 
 
5.4 Oil spill information 
Total oil spilled because of machinery failures are 1,7 t. Out of these1 ton is assumed. With a 
pollution frequency 8,47x10-5 environmental pollution cases per shipyear machinery failures 
do not possess a real threat against environment. In one case the origin of the pollution was 
a cargo tank, in the second one a fuel tank and in the last one unclear. 
 
 
 
NOTE:5 accidents are not 
characterized as serious or non 
serious. 
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5.5 Shipyards, flags, classes 
 
Table 5.2. Class, when accident occurred. 
class  cases 
American Bureau of Shipping 26 
Bureau Veritas 11 
Det Norske Veritas 25 
Indian Register 3 
Lloyds Register 23 
Nippon Kaiji 1 
South Korean Register 1 
 TOTAL 90 
NOTE: Data available only for 90 cases 
 
Table 5.3. Shipyard (country) of built for large tankers, that presented machinery failure. 
Shipyard (country)  cases 
Japan 19 
Korea (South) 47 
China 8 
Yugoslavia 6 
India 2 
Sweden 1 
Spain 2 
Norway 0 
Ukraine 3 
Brazil 1 
Poland 1 
Russia 1 
United States of America 7 
TOTAL 98 
NOTE: Data available only for 98 cases. 
Shipyard, where the tanker was built in, seems of low importance compared to the company 
that manufactured a machinery system. 
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Table 5.4. Flag, when machinery failure occurred. 
Flag    
Liberia 119 Australia 11 
Greece 37 Bermuda  9 
Venezuela 3 Sri Lanka 2 
Singapore 12 Libya 5 
Panama 45 Tuvalu 3 
UAE 1 Gibraltar 1 
Cyprus 17 Kuwait 11 
Iran 5 Sa. 1 
Belize 5 Hong Kong 2 
Philippines 1 Malaysia 10 
France 1 Spain 3 
Italy 2 Marshall Islands 9 
United States of America 2 KOREA (NORTH) 1 
India 5 Saint Vincent 3 
Barbados 1 Korea (South) 1 
Malta 16 Japan 3 
Bermuda (British) 1 Norway 2 
Isle of Man (British) 2 Denmark International Register (DIS) 2 
Isle of Man  1 Romania 1 
Comoros 1 TAAF 1 
St Kitts & Nevis 1 PORTUGAL (MAR) 1 
Norwegian International Register(NIS) 24 Luxembourg 1 
Bahamas 28  TOTAL 414 
Yugoslavia 1     
NOTE: No data available for 3 cases. 
 
Figure 5.13. Flag, when machinery failure occurred. Does it belong to TOP 11 FOC? 
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TOP 11 Flags Of Convenience –according to world fleet in 2009 (merchant ships in general-
not only large tankers) in DWT-are: Panama, Malta, St. Vincent, Liberia, Cyprus, France FIS, 
Marshall Islands, Antigua, Cayman Islands, Bahamas, Bermuda. They account for almost 55% 
of the entire world fleet as of 2009 (independently of ship type, DWT over 1000t) .It is worth 
noting that ships registered under flags of Panama, Malta, St. Vincent, Antigua, Cayman 
Islands, Bahamas are in US target list, as far as Port State targeting is concerned (as of 2009). 
 
TOP 11 FOC (Flags Of Convenience) account for almost 55% of the entire world fleet. 
Considering the above figures, the conclusion can be drawn, that flag does not seem to play 
a significant role in machinery failures.  
 
 
 
5.6 Frequencies 
Table 5.5. Frequency per shipyear, number and average age of machinery failures by ship’s 
size. 
ships' size cases frequency 
Average age of 
machinery failure 
PANAMAX 64 1,17E-02 13,1 
AFRAMAX 141 1,10E-02 12,4 
SUEZMAX 91 1,38E-02 13,4 
VLCC 98 1,00E-02 13,8 
ULCC 23 2,97E-02 16,1 
TOTAL 417 1,18E-02 13,3 
 
We draw the conclusion, that ship’s size does not affect in an obvious way machinery 
failures. Exception applies for ULCC and could possibly be attributed to small sample and to 
the fact that ULCC are older compared to the other large tanker’s categories. ULCC tankers,  
that suffered a machinery failure were built between 1974 and 1977 (one exception, built in 
1980’s).  Maintenance and inspection are of greater importance, as a ship gets older. 
Table 5.6. Frequency of serious, non serious and in total machinery failures per shipyear. 
category Frequency per shipyear 
machinery failures in total 1,17Ex10-2 
non serious machinery failures 7,96Ex10-3 
serious mach. failures 3,67Ex10-3 
 
137 
 
Evangelos Farmakis                                NTUA-Ship Design Labotarory                             September 2014 
 
 
Figure 5.14. Frequency of machinery failures per shipyear and severity level. 
The peaks and thus the worst situation for machinery failures is to be found within the first 
years of the 1990’s. From then on, machinery failures are less and less frequent, as the years 
go by. There is a tendency for deterioration from 2007 on, but it can be considered as 
negligable. The picture is clear and more positive, as time goes by. 
The fact, that failures tend to be characterized mostly as serious, as time goes by, could be 
confirmed again. At first it was noticed, while studying Non Accidental Structural Failures 
(NASF). 
The very high frequencies, that can be observed between 1990 and 1992 could not be fully 
explained. It is amazing though, that 224 out of 417 machinery failures in total for the 
studied period took place within this relatively small interval!  Here is some data regarding 
these 224 cases: 
 In general the average age of failure is 14 years. 12.9 % are characterized as serious.  
 When taking ship’s size into account: a) Panamax: 34/224, average age of 13.2 years 
and 9% serious.. b) Aframax: 74/225, average age of 12.8 years and 12% serious. c) 
Suezmax: 43/224, average age of 14.9 years and 14% serious. d)VLCC: 56/224, 
average age of 14.8 years and 12.5% serious. e) ULCC: 17/224, average age of 15.4 
years and 24% serious. 
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5.7 Large tankers built after 1981 
This chapter is in fact a subchapter that could be included in the chapters above. As far as 
fleet at risk by age is concerned, there is data available only for large tankers built after 
1981. The thesis in general concerns large tankers regardless of date of built. Therefore and 
in order to avoid misconceptions, some extra data is provided for large tankers built after 
1981 in this separate chapter. Fleet at risk by age, as mentioned in chapter 3 was provided 
by Germanischer Llloyd. 
In total there are 141 cases  that large tankers built after 1981 presented a machinery 
failure. 
 
Figure 5.15. Frequency of machinery failures per shipyear by age. Large tankers built after 
1981. 
Surprisingly, the greatest frequencies are to be seen at a young rather than at old age. That 
should be attributes mainly to bad manufacturing of the machinery systems and also 
operating of the ship. Maintenance is also an important parameter, but could not be 
considered as a main cause, because maintenance becomes more important as ships 
become older and older ships present lower frequencies of machinery failures. 
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Table 5.7. Number of machinery failures by age. Ships built after 1981. 
ship's age Machinery failure cases 
1 15 
2 16 
3 9 
4 10 
5 14 
6 10 
7 5 
8 14 
9 12 
10 7 
11 7 
12 5 
13 1 
14 5 
15 2 
16 3 
17 0 
18 2 
19 0 
20 1 
21 1 
22 1 
23 1 
24 0 
25 0 
TOTAL 141 
 
 
 
5.8 Machinery failures categorization  
After studying NTUA-SDL database the target was to categorize somehow the different 
machinery failures of the database. At first, the idea was to focus on the causes of the 
machinery failures. Unfortunately, that was not possible for two reasons:1) The database 
rather describes what failed than analyzing the reasons. That is only rarely here the case.2) 
Ship’s machinery does not consist of independent pieces of equipment, but at a great 
percentage of codependent systems and machines.  
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As a result the final decision was to make a categorization that answers to the question 
“What did break down?” or “Where did the failure occur?”. There were 3 categorizations 
available: 
1. One developed after reading the database, without including the machinery systems 
and equipment that were not mentioned in the studied database. There are 6 basic 
categories namely “main engine”, ”shaft and propeller”, “steering gear”, “inert gas 
system”, “auxiliary and emergency systems and machines” and “insufficiently 
reported”. 
2. One I found during my stay at Germanischer Lloyd headquarters in Hamburg and is 
the one used by surveyors of GL.( “Tables Equipment System Surveys-SIS”).  
3. SFI by SpecTec. SFI group system is a functional oriented classification system for 
subdivision of ship technical and economic information. SFI uses a 3 digit code, that 
breaks the ship into functions, systems and subsystems. 
Finally, I worked with the SFI-categorization, which is really clear and functional. The basic 
categories remained the same and after some alterations the result is this: 
Table 5.8. Main and subcategories of machinery failure categorization. 
Main 
categories 
1) Machinery main 
components 
2) Systems for 
machinery main 
components 
3) Ship common systems 
Sub 
categories 
1. Diesel engines 
for propulsion 
1. Fuel systems 
 
1. Ballast and bilge 
systems, gutter pipes 
outside accommodation  
 2. Steam machinery  
for propulsion 
2. Lube oil systems 2. Fire& lifeboat alarm, 
fire fighting &wash down 
systems 
 3.  Other types of  
propulsion 
machinery 
3. Cooling systems 3. Air &sounding systems 
from tanks to deck  
 4. Propellers,  
transmissions, foils 
4. Compressed air 
systems 
4. Special common 
hydraulic oil systems 
 5. Boilers, steam and 
gas generators 
5. Exhaust systems and 
air  
Intakes 
5. Central heat transfer 
systems w/chemical 
fluids/oil 
 6. Motor aggregates 
for 
main electric power 
production 
6. Steam condensate 
and 
feed water systems 
6. Common electric and 
electronic systems 
 7. Other aggregates 
and generators for 
main and emergency 
electric 
power production 
7. Distilled and make-up 
water systems 
7. Electric power supply 
 8. Nuclear reactor 
plants 
8. Automation systems 
for machinery 
8. Common electric 
distribution systems  
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   9. Electric cable 
installation 
    10. Electric consumer 
systems 
 
4) Ship equipment 5) Equipment for 
cargo 
6) Insufficiently 
reported 
1. Maneuvering 
machinery and 
equipment 
1. Loading/discharging  
systems for liquid cargo  
 
2. Navigation & 
searching equipment 
2 .Freezing, refrigerating 
and heating systems for 
cargo 
 
3. Communication 
equipment 
3. Gas ventilation 
systems for cargo 
holds/tanks 
 
4. Repairing/ 
maintenance/cleanin
g/ 
equipment 
workshop/store 
outfit, name plates 
4. Auxiliary systems 
&equipment for cargo 
 
 
Below are the components of each subcategory, so that it becomes clear which machinery 
systems are included in each category and subcategory: 
                          1) Machinery main components  
1. Diesel engines for propulsion →a) diesel engines. 
 2. Steam machinery for propulsion→ a) steam turbines/condensers, b) high pressure 
turbines, c) medium and low pressure turbines, d) main condensers, e) steam engines with 
condensers.      
 3. Other types of propulsion machinery  a) gas turbines/air preheaters, b) electric 
generator / electric motor plants, c) fan plants, waterjet pump plants with nozzles, d) special 
propulsion aggregates. 
 4.Propellers, transmissions, foils  a) fixed propeller plants including nozzles, b) main shaft 
brake, c) controllable pitch propeller, plants including nozzles, d) special propellers plants 
including nozzles (excluding side thrusters), e)spare propellers, f) main reduction gears with 
thrust bearings  and couplings,  g) central gears (joint auxiliary gear, not for propulsion), h) 
foils, sails with mast and rigging. 
5.Boilers,steam and gas generatorsa) main boilers, b) auxiliary boilers, c) exhaust gas boilers,              
d) steam converters, e) control heating and thermal oil boilers,  f) gas generators. 
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                            6. Motor aggregates for main electric power productiona) motor aggregates  
7.Other aggregates and generators for main and emergency electric power productiona) 
steam turbo aggregates, b) gas turbo aggregates, c) harbour and emergency aggregates with 
equipment, d) shaft generators, e) generators with hydraulic drive. 
8.Nuclear reactor plants. 
 
2) Systems for machinery main components 
 1. Fuel systems a) fuel oil transfer and drain systems, b) fuel oil purification plants, c) fuel 
oil supply systems, d) heating coils in fuel oil tanks, e) gas fuel systems, f)solid fuel systems 
(e.g. coal). 
2. Lube oil systemsa) lube oil transfer and drain systems, b) lube oil purification plants, c) 
lube oil systems for propulsion, machinery and transmissions, d) lube oil systems for 
motor/turbo aggregates, e) lube oil systems for gas generators, common lub oil systems for 
other machinery. 
3. Cooling systemsa) sea water cooling systems, b) fresh water and other cooling systems. 
4.Compressed air systems a) starting air systems (high pressure),b)general purpose air 
systems for E/R (low pressure),c) general purpose air systems for deck (low pressure),d) 
instrument air supply systems.  
5. Exhaust systems and air intakesa) fresh air intakes(not ventilation),b) exhaust gas 
systems for propulsion machinery, c) exhaust gas systems for motor aggregates, d) exhaust 
gas system for boilers, e) ash/slag handling systems. 
6. Steam condensate and feed water systems a) primary full pressure steam systems, b) 
primary reduced pressure steam systems in E/R, c) primary reduced pressure systems 
outside E/R, d) primary drain blowoff, exhaling steam and dearation system in E/R, e) 
primary condensate systems, f) primary feed water systems, g) secondary steam systems in 
E/R, h) secondary steam systems outside E/R, i) secondary condensate and feed water                  
systems. 
7. Distilled and make-up water systemsa) freshwater production system, b) technical 
freshwater system. 
8. Automation systems for machinery a) maneuvering consoles, main consoles, b) 
common automation equipment, E/R alarm systems, c) automation equipment for 
propellers machinery and  transmission, eng. telegraph, d) automation equipment for 
boilers, e) automation equipment for motor/ turbo aggregates, f) automation equipment for 
nuclear reactor plants, g) automation equipment for other machinery components, h) 
cables/ loads and piping for automation systems for machinery. 
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3) Ship common systems      
1. Ballast and bilge systems, gutter pipes outside accommodation  a) ballast systems, solid 
ballast, b) heating coils in ballast tanks, c) bilge systems, d) gutter pipes outside 
accommodation, e) drainage from indoor cargo holds, f) condensate drain system, g) 
drainage from technical spaces. 
2. Fire& lifeboat alarm, fire fighting & washing down systemsa) fire detection, fire 
&lifeboat alarm systems, b) emergency shutdown system, c) fire/wash down system, 
emergency fire pumps, sprinkler system, d) fire fighting systems for external fires, e) fire 
fighting systems with gas (CO2,halon, etc), f) fire fighting systems with foam, g) fire fighting 
systems with steam and water spraying, h) fire fighting systems with powder, i) no 
pressurized deluge system or fire fighting with other means. 
3. Air & sounding systems from tanks to decka) bleed and overflow pipe systems, b) 
manual sounding system, c) automatic/remote sounding system.  
4. Special common hydraulic oil systemsa)special common hydraulic oil systems. 
5. Central heat transfer systems with chemical fluids/oila) heating oil treatment systems, 
b) heating oil distribution systems for E/R, c) heating oil distribution outside E/R. 
6. Common electric and  electronic systemsa) common computer systems. 
7. Electric power supplya) (generators/alternators), b) transformers, c) batteries and 
chargers, d) rectifiers& converters, e) electric shore supply systems. 
8. Common electric distribution systems a) main switchboards, b) emergency 
switchboards, c) group starters, d) local starters, e) distribution panels &boards. 
9. Electric cable installationa)cable trays & installation in engine & boiler rooms, b)cable 
trays with installation in accommodation, c)cable trays &installation on deck & in cargo 
holds, d)special cables. 
10. Electric consumer systemsa)electric lighting systems for engine & boiler room, 
b)electric lighting systems for accommodation, c)electric lightning  systems for deck and 
cargo holds, d)electric fans, e)elektriske motorer. 
 
4) Ship equipment 
1.Manoeuvering machinery  &equipment a) rudder with welded parts, b) rudder carriers, 
rudder stocks, rudder bearings, c) steering gear/ columns, telemotor systems, rudder 
indicators, emergency st, d) side thrusters, e) stabilizers, f) brakes, g) bubble plants, h) 
dynamic positioning systems. 
2. Navigation& searching equipmenta) radar plants, b) GPS, DECCA, LORAN, OMEGA, radio 
direction finder- equipment, c) gyro plants, autopilots, compasses, d) underwater searching 
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equipment, e) navigation TV, f) nautical utility equip, clockworks, weather facsimile  g) radar, 
signal, observation and antenna masts, h) integrated navigation systems. 
3. Communication equipmenta)radio plant, GMDSS, b)lifeboat radio transmitters, EPIRBS, 
c)data transmission plants, communication, d) VHF/UHF telephones, 
e)calling/command/crew call telephone plants, walkie-talkies, f)speaking tubes, tube post 
plants, g)light & signal equipment, lanterns, typhoons. 
 4.Repairing/ maintenance/ cleaning equipment workshop/store outfit ,name plates a) 
machine tools, cutting & welding equipment, b) tools/ equipment for engineers, electr., 
boatswains, carpenters, c) painting equipment, scaffolding, paint rafts/boats (gigs), d) 
cleaning equipment, garbage chutes, e) garbage disposal plants, incinerators, f) outfitting in 
store rooms and workshops, g) clamps/foundations for spare parts, h) name plates/marking 
on machinery, equipment, pipes, cables. 
5) Equipment for cargo 
1. Loading/discharging systems for liquid cargoa) loading/discharging pumps, b) 
loading/discharging systems on deck, c) loading/discharging systems in pump rooms, d) 
loading/discharging systems in cargo tanks, e) loading/discharging systems for lpg/ lng in 
gaseous phase ,f) separate stripping systems, g) mud systems with pumps, piping, h) 
submerged turret loading system, STL, i) bow loading system(BLS). 
2. Freezing refrigerating & heating  systems for cargoa) insulation & sheathing of cargo 
holds/tanks, b) freezing &refrigerating systems for dry cargo, c) direct cooling systems for 
liquid cargo, d) cascade cooling systems for liquid cargo, e) indirect cooling/heating systems, 
cargo oil heating. 
3. Gas/ventilation systems for cargo holds/tanksa)ventilation systems for refrigerated 
cargo holds, b)closed ventilation/return vapour systems for cargo holds, c)open ventilation 
systems for cargo holds, d)ventilation/gas freeing systems for tanks, wind sails with 
equipment, e) blow-off system from safety valves(pressure/vacuum valves), f)inert gas 
systems with conditioning plant. 
4. Auxiliary systems & equipment for cargo a) sounding, surveillance & operating 
equipment for cargo systems, b) tank cleaning systems & equipment, c) separate cooling 
water systems for cargo equipment, d) insulation drying system for cargo holds/tanks, e) 
equipment for addition of preservatives, inhibitors, spirits, f) special structures for 
loading/discharging over stern/stem. 
6) Insufficiently reported 
Cases that are not easily categorized, because of lack/ insufficiency of data. 
 
417 cases where studied. Some cases were categorized in more than one categories, 
because in these cases more than one pieces of equipment/systems presented a failure. 
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Below stand the cases for each category and subcategory as absolute numbers and as 
percentages: 
 
Figure 5.16. Main machinery failure categories. Distribution by machinery system, that 
failed. 
Table 5.9. Main machinery failure categories. Distribution by machinery system, that failed. 
 category cases percentage 
1 Machinery main components 278 65% 
2 Systems for machinery main 
components 
16 4% 
3 Ship common systems 68 16% 
4 Ship equipment 31 7% 
5 Equipment for 
cargo 
12 3% 
6 Insufficiently 
reported 
22 5% 
 TOTAL 427 100% 
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Table 5.10.a. Machinery main components (1st category) 
1 Machinery main components cases percentage 
1.1 Diesel engines 
for propulsion 
156 56% 
1.2 Steam machinery  
for propulsion 
10 4% 
 
1.3 Other types of  
propulsion machinery 
1 0% 
1.4 Propellers,  
transmissions, foils 
38 14% 
1.5 Boilers, steam and 
gas generators 
53 19% 
1.6 Motor aggregates for 
main electric power 
production 
- - 
1.7 Other aggregates and generators 
for main and emergency electric 
power production 
14 5% 
1.8 Nuclear reactor plants - - 
1.9 Without subcategory(no further 
categorization possible) 
6 2% 
 TOTAL 278 100% 
 
Table 5.10.b. Systems for machinery main components (2nd category) 
2 systems for machinery main 
components 
cases percentage 
2.1 Fuel systems 
 
5 31% 
2.2 Lube oil systems 1 6,3% 
2.3 Cooling systems 4 25% 
2.4 Compressed air systems 1 6,3% 
2.5 Exhaust systems and air  
Intakes 
- - 
2.6 Steam condensate and 
feed water systems 
4 25% 
2.7 Distilled and make-up 
water systems 
- - 
2.8 Automation systems for machinery - - 
2.9 Without subcategory (no further 
categorization possible) 
1 6,3% 
 TOTAL 16 100% 
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Table 5.10.c. Ship common systems (3rd category) 
3 ship common systems cases percentage 
3.1 Ballast and bilge systems, gutter 
pipes 
outside accommodation  
1 1,5% 
3.2 Fire& lifeboat alarm, fire fighting 
&wash down systems 
1 1,5% 
3.3 Air &sounding systems 
from tanks to deck  
- - 
3.4 Special common hydraulic oil 
systems 
- - 
3.5 Central heat transfer systems with 
chemical fluids/oil 
- - 
3.6 Common electric and electronic 
systems 
- - 
3.7 Electric power supply 65 95,5% 
3.8 Common electric distribution 
systems  
1 1,5% 
3.9 Electric cable installation - - 
3.10 Electric consumer systems - - 
3.11 Without subcategory (no further 
categorization possible) 
- - 
 TOTAL 68 100% 
 
Table 5.10.d. Ship equipment (4th category) 
4 ship equipment cases percentage 
4.1 Maneuvering machinery and 
equipment 
31 100% 
4.2 Navigation & searching equipment -  
4.3 Communication equipment -  
4.4 Repairing/maintennce/cleaning/ 
Equipment workshop/store outfit, 
name plates 
-  
4.5 Without subcategory(no further 
categorization possible) 
-  
 TOTAL 31 100% 
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Table 5.10.e. Equipment for cargo( 5th category) 
5 equipment for 
cargo 
cases percentage 
5.1 Loading/discharging  
systems for liquid cargo  
7 58% 
5.2 Freezing, refrigerating and heating 
systems for cargo 
- - 
5.3 Gas ventilation systems for cargo 
holds/tanks 
5 42% 
5.4 Auxiliary systems &equipment for 
cargo 
- - 
5.5 Without subcategory (no further 
categorization possible) 
- - 
 TOTAL 12 100% 
 
Comments 
-Typical descriptions in the NTUA/SDL database of cases characterized as “insufficiently 
reported” are:”minor repairs”, ”cylinder pipe out of order”, ”adrift”, ”machinery trouble”, 
”machinery trouble and adrift”, ”mechanical problems”, “broke down on numerous 
occasions”, “repairs to machinery to heat the fuel”, “hydraulic pump”. 
-The greatest of percentage concerns main engine problems. One should keep in mind that 
maybe a lot of these 156 cases concern a machinery main component and not necessarily 
the main engine itself. The vast percentage of the database descriptions are really short and 
lack details.  
-The ship’s machinery systems that present the most of the failures are: main and auxiliary 
engines, propellers and transmission mechanisms-gears, boilers, generators, alternators, 
rudders and steering gear. 
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                            5.9 Conclusions-machinery failures 
 
-The most possible scenario of a large tanker’s machinery failure is this one: A ship is en 
route in open sea and its main engine presents a failure. The age of this hypothetical ship is 
15-20 years old, when ”Group ages of large tankers, which suffered machinery failure” 
(figure 5.2-independently of year of built) is studied and rather young (<10 years), when 
“Frequency of machinery failures per shipyear by age” (figure 5.15-built after 1981) is taken 
into consideration. 
-Machinery failures, that did not lead to another accident category (collision, contact, 
grounding) are the category of tanker’s failures with the least social interest, because they 
do not seem to possess a real threat against human life and environment. Machinery failures 
affect mostly financial interests, because their usual consequence is the delay of the 
transportation of the cargo. For example a main engine fails and  3-4 days are required in 
order to be fixed. 
-Ship’s size does not seem to play a role. Exception applies for ULCC and could possibly be 
attributed to small sample and to the fact that ULCC are older compared to the other large 
tanker’s categories. Maintenance and inspection are of greater importance, as a ship gets 
older. 
-Of little importance seem to be shipyard, where the ship was built and flag. Class maybe 
plays a role, because they are the ones in charge of inspecting the different machinery 
systems. To sum up, manufacturers, operators and inspectors of a machine are the ones 
responsible for the quality and maintenance of a machine. Manufacturers are the company, 
where the machine was built, operators are the crew and inspectors are the classification 
society and the ones who were sent by the ship’s ownership to attend and inspect during 
the building procedures.  Lastly, even if ship’s size does play a role, it is difficult to assume 
that for instance a boiler failure could be attributed to the ship’s size. Manufacturing and 
inspection seem of greater importance. 
-There is no real evidence that weather is important. Nevertheless, most of the machinery 
failures occurred, while the ship was en route in open sea, thus operating condition and 
location as parameters should not be neglected. 
-To find out the causes of machinery failures seems difficult, because ship’s machinery 
consists of codependent rather than individual systems. 
-After studying the sample for large tankers built after 1981, the surprising conclusion can be 
drawn, the greatest machinery failure frequencies are to be seen at a young rather than at 
old age (see figure 5.15). That should be attributes mainly to bad manufacturing of the 
machinery systems and also operating of the ship. Maintenance is also an important 
parameter, but could not be considered as a main cause, because maintenance becomes 
more important as ships become older and  older ships present lower frequencies of 
machinery failure. 
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Figure 5.17. Machinery failure frequency per shipyear, when the studied period is divided in 
3 time intervals. Independently of year of built. 
Frequencies of machinery failures for large tanker ships independently of year of built are 
shown in Fig. 5.17.  A significant drop of failure frequencies after 1992 is observed. This may 
be attributed to 
 improvements of technology, training and maintenance procedures  
 gradual phase out of older tankers. 
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6 Conclusions-The way ahead 
No straightforward relationship between ship’s age and NASF was observed. 44% of NASF 
concerns ships older than 15 years. This indicates an expected connection between ship’s 
age and structural problems.12% of NASF concerns young ships (till 5 years old).Even more 
these are ships built in more recent years; this reveals possible manufacturing problems in 
more recent shipbuildings. NASF occurred at an average age of 14,4 years. It should be 
noted that there are great deviations. Ship’s built in the 1990’s and thereafter present a very  
small average age of NASF occurrence (5,4 years). The average age of DH tankers, that 
suffered a NASF is only 6,2, small compared to 13,8 average age of NASF for non DH designs. 
That piece of information can be misleading, because DH fleet is younger than non DH fleet, 
yet it remains problematic that so young DH tankers suffered a NASF (56% of DH accidents 
concerns ships till 5 years old). By studying the frequencies, the conclusion can be drawn 
that a non DH large tanker is more likely to suffer a NASF compared to a DH one (2,37x10-3 
NASF per shipyear for non DH and 1,16x10-3  for DH). When focusing on ship’s size the 
noticeable difference is to be found in the interval 5-10 years.28 % of Panamax NASF are to 
be found within these age limits, by far the  highest compared to the other large tanker’s 
sizes. The average ages of NASF occurrence are comparable between the 5 tanker sizes. 
NASF frequency for the large tankers of the studied period is 4,124x10-3 failures per shipyear. 
Over the last 23 years the frequency decreases. Possible factors are regulatory measures, 
changes in ship design and technology and overall improvement of the safety culture of 
maritime industry. ULCC present the highest NASF frequency per shipyear, something 
explained partly by the very large developed stresses, when these titans travel in open sea. 
After studying the available data for large tankers built after 1981 the conclusion has been 
drawn that non double hull large tankers are more likely about to suffer NASF and at a 
younger age (as far as frequencies are concerned). The first part complies with the findings 
for large tankers regardless of date of built. But the second part provides something new 
and extra proof, that maritime industry makes steps forward towards becoming safer and 
environmentally friendlier, as DH designs fail at an older age.  
An accident gets more easily characterized as serious over time or-to rephrase it- more 
rarely is a reported  accident characterized as non serious nowadays. 
57% of NASF took place in open sea. Surprisingly, a great percentage took place in terminal 
waters, something that could be attributed to loading mistakes, like ship being overloaded 
or incorrectly loaded. Open sea is more frequently the event location of a NASF, as the ship’s 
size gets bigger. 
A loaded tanker is more likely to suffer a NASF in comparison to an unloaded tanker. 
33% of NASF are weather related, although weather can not affect a seaworthy, correctly 
designed, manufactured, operated ship, that follows all the right inspection and monitoring 
procedures. 
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60% of NASF leads to Loss Of Watertight Integrity (LOWI). Panamax present LOWI at 83,3%, 
a percentage significantly greater, than those of the other large tanker’s sizes, which vary 
between 50% and 58%. Non DH ships seem to be more vulnerable to LOWI than DH. The 
fact, that non DH fleet is older than DH fleet is of great importance though. Average age of 
LOWI occurrence for DH tankers is  only 4 years and for non DH ones 14,3. For DH that 
means mostly poor manufacturing and for non DH inadequate maintenance. 
At 68% of the cases the damaged ship’s part was hull, 23% internal and 9% deck. DH tankers 
present mostly internal structural problems, while non DH tankers present mostly hull 
problems. (key words: global stresses, maintenance, age, simplicity of design) 
NASF do not present a great danger for life of crew (5,56x10-5 fatalities per shipyear). 
Contrariwise NASF pose a significant threat for the environment. Frequency is 1,1x10-3 NASF 
per shipyear leading to (even the slightest)  environmental pollution for the large tankers of 
the studied period. 174039 tonnes of oil were spilled in total. 3 out of 39 pollution related 
accidents are responsible for 96% of the total environmental pollution (in tones) caused by 
NASF. Environmental pollution was caused at the greatest percentage by non DH Panamax 
and Aframax tankers. 
Shipyard(country), the tanker was built in: Unfortunately, there was no available data as far 
as fleet at risk by manufacturing country is concerned, and thus frequencies could not be 
calculated.  
There seems to be no obvious and straightforward relationship between flag, under which 
the ship was operated, and NASF. A relationship between NASF and ships flying a flag of 
convenience appears possible, but could not be proved within the frame of this thesis, as we 
lacked sufficient data for the fleet at risk by flag of operation.  
The relationship between classification societies and ship’s seaworthiness is clear, but lack of 
data makes it impossible to draw precise conclusions. 
 
 
 
The most possible scenario of a large tanker’s machinery failure is this one: A ship is en 
route in open sea and its main engine presents a failure. The age of this hypothetical ship is 
not clear.  
Machinery failures, that did not lead to another accident category (collision, contact, 
grounding) are the category of tanker’s failures with the least social interest, because they 
do not seem to possess a real threat against human life and environment. Machinery failures 
affect mostly financial interests, because their usual consequence is the delay of the 
transportation of the cargo. 
Ship’s size does not seem to play a role. It is difficult to assume that for instance a boiler 
failure could be attributed to the ship’s size. Manufacturing and inspection seem of greater 
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importance. Of low importance seem also shipyard, where the ship was built and flag. Class 
maybe plays a role, because they are the ones in charge of inspecting the different 
machinery systems. Lastly, even if ship’s size does play a role, it is difficult to assume that for 
instance a boiler failure could be attributed to the ship’s size. Manufacturing and inspection 
seem of greater importance. 
There is no real evidence that weather is important. Nevertheless, most of the machinery 
failures occurred, while the ship was en route in open sea, thus operating condition and 
location as parameters should not be neglected. 
To find out the causes of machinery failures seems difficult, because ship’s machinery 
consists of codependent rather than individual systems. 
Machinery failure frequency gets less, as time goes by, proving that manufacturing, 
operating and inspecting of machinery systems become better and more effective. 
 
 
 
This thesis focused on the statistical analysis and study of two of the less studied tanker 
accident categories, namely Non Accidental Structural Failures (NASF) and machinery 
failures of large tankers. 
As seen above lack of data determines the potential of the current thesis. Among others it 
would be of great importance, if the following data was available: 1) fleet at risk by flag, class 
and manufacturing country, 2) the class and hull type of the examined accidents with 
unknown class and hull type, 3) more precise technical text in the database. Unfortunately, 
access to that kind of data is difficult. I assume, that even if the same thesis could be 
“repeated” with enriched data, then the results would be far more striking and clear. For 
example, there were some indications of problematic manufacturing in the recent years, for 
instance in China based shipyards, but no safe conclusions could be extracted based on the 
currently available data. Furthermore, it would be interesting to see how practical the 
developed NASF fault tree is, that means to check at what extent it could cover the different 
causes of a NASF. This could be proven after studying enough analytical reports of accidents 
(when available). On the spotlight should be the measures, that should be applied in order 
to decrease even more the frequency and severity of the accidents. Last but not least, 
similar researches on NASF and machinery failures for other ship sizes and ships with 
fundamentally different designs (for instance containerships, passenger ships) will make the 
in depth understanding of these two accident categories possible.  
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